The supply of non-renewable resources by Daubanes, Julien Xavier & Lasserre, Pierre
u n i ve r s i t y  o f  co pe n h ag e n  
The supply of non-renewable resources
Daubanes, Julien Xavier; Lasserre, Pierre
Published in:
Canadian Journal of Economics
DOI:
10.1111/caje.12394
Publication date:
2019
Document version
Early version, also known as pre-print
Citation for published version (APA):
Daubanes, J. X., & Lasserre, P. (2019). The supply of non-renewable resources. Canadian Journal of
Economics, 52(3), 1084-1111. https://doi.org/10.1111/caje.12394
Download date: 09. Oct. 2020
  
The supply of  
non-renewable resources 
 
 
 
Julien Xavier Daubanes 
Pierre Lasserre 
 
2017 / 03 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IFRO Working Paper 2017 / 03 
The supply of non-renewable resources 
Authors: Julien Xavier Daubanes, Pierre Lasserre 
JEL-classification: Q38; D21: H22 
Published: March 2017 
See the full series IFRO Working Paper here: 
www.ifro.ku.dk/english/publications/foi_series/working_papers/  
Department of Food and Resource Economics (IFRO) 
University of Copenhagen 
Rolighedsvej 25 
DK 1958 Frederiksberg  DENMARK  
www.ifro.ku.dk/english/  
The Supply of Non-Renewable Resources⋆
by
Julien Xavier Daubanes
Department of Food and Resource Economics at University of Copenhagen, and CESifo
E-mail address: jxd@ifro.ku.dk
and
Pierre Lasserre
De´partement des Sciences E´conomiques at Universite´ du Que´bec A` Montre´al, CIRANO,
and CIREQ
E-mail address: lasserre.pierre@uqam.ca
March, 2017
⋆ Earlier drafts of this paper have been presented in various seminars and conferences:
Montreal Natural Resources and Environmental Economics Workshop; SURED; CESifo
Workshop; CREE; Toulouse School of Economics; Universite´ du Que´bec a` Montre´al; Uni-
versite´ de Savoie; EAERE Pre-conference in Honor of Michel Moreaux; Paris School of
Economics; Geneva Graduate Institute. Particular thanks go to Ge´rard Gaudet, Andre´ Gri-
maud, Michael Hoel, Sean Horan, Matti Liski, Ngo Van Long, Je´re´my Laurent-Lucchetti,
David Martimort, Charles Mason, Rick van der Ploeg, Debraj Ray, Franc¸ois Salanie´, Steve
Salant, Hans-Werner Sinn and Cees Withagen. Financial support from the Social Science
and Humanities Research Council of Canada, the Fonds Que´be´cois de recherche pour les
sciences et la culture, the CIREQ and the CESifo is gratefully acknowledged.
Abstract
There exists no formal treatment of non-renewable resource (NRR) supply, systematically
deriving quantity as function of price. We establish instantaneous restricted (fixed reserves)
and unrestricted NRR supply functions. The supply of a NRR at any date and location not
only depends on the local contemporary price of the resource but also on prices at all other
dates and locations. Besides the usual law of supply, which characterizes the own-price
effect, cross-price effects have their own law. They can be decomposed into a substitution
effect and a stock compensation effect. We show that the substitution effect always dom-
inates: A price increase at some point in space and time causes NRR supply to decrease
at all other points. This new but orthodox supply setting extends to NRRs the partial
equilibrium analysis of demand and supply policies. Thereby, it provides a generalization
of many results about policy-induced changes on NRR markets. The properties of restricted
and unrestricted supply functions are characterized for Hotelling (homogeneous) as well as
Ricardian (non homogeneous) reserves, for a single deposit as well as for several deposits
that endogenously come into production or cease to be active.
JEL classification: Q38; D21: H22
Keywords: Allocating reserves; Supply theory; Substitution effect; Stock compensation
effect; Green paradox; Spatial leakage
1 Introduction
The standard theory of competitive supply treats price as exogenous. Curiously such a
treatment is missing for non-renewable resources (hereafter NRRs). We fill the gap in this
paper, providing a treatment that can also be adapted to commodities that need to be
produced before being allocated to various uses in space and time. The path of prices over
time and their distribution in space are taken as parametric and we study the properties of
supply functions, that is the effect on the quantity supplied at any date or location of a price
change occurring at any date or location. Such a highly orthodox approach is new. The
literature treats prices as constant or as a single-parameter path, or alternatively studies the
intersection of supply and demand without any prior treatment of supply. By establishing
comparative static properties, our treatment extends to NRRs the time-honored partial
equilibrium method of shifting demand and supply curves. It has immediate applications to
the green paradox, spatial carbon leakages or NRR extraction responses to various policies.
The question of NRR supply has a long history and remains very contemporary. It was
first addressed by Gray (1914) and formally undertaken by Burness (1976). They specifically
inquired about the effect on the extraction path of changing the exogenous price, assumed to
be constant throughout the extraction period. Sweeney (1993) later attempted to reconcile
NRR supply with conventional supply theory, by deriving resource supply as a function of
the contemporary producer price. He stated that “static supply functions, so typical in
most economic analysis, are inconsistent with optimal extraction of depletable resources”
(p. 780) but left the task unfinished.
The recent interest in the green paradox and carbon leakage has given rise to a number
of contributions that focus in various ways on the effects across time and/or space of policy
decisions implemented at various future dates and locations. The first ones (Long and Sinn,
1985; Sinn, 2008) assumed reserves to be homogeneous and given rather than heterogeneous
and produced (by exploration and development). More recent contributions relaxed these
assumptions in various ways. Hoel (2012), van der Ploeg and Withagen (2012a, 2012b,
2014) and Grafton, Kompas and Long (2012) considered that some part of the resource
may be left unexploited after a demand-restricting policy change, due to heterogeneity in
extraction costs. The same is true in the paper by Fischer and Salant (2013) who also
considered carbon leakage and payed particular attention to the type of policy used to
reduce NRR demand.
Harstad (2012) focused on supply policy. He showed that buying up and sterilizing NRR
reserves will reduce consumption and emissions, whether supply is static as in the core of
his paper, or dynamic as in the two-period extension (p. 97). Venables (2014) offered a
dynamic theoretical treatment of NRR supply. In the long run, supply is determined by
reserves developed within an optimal investment process. However, the equilibrium market
price is assumed to grow at some constant rate. Golosov, Hassler, Krusell, and Tsyvinski
(2014) considered supply taxation policy in equilibrium. Their formulation of the NRR
supply side comes closest to the one offered in this paper. In the decentralized equilibrium,
NRR producers maximize profits given prices under a constraint imposed by finite reserves.
However they did not derive supply functions nor did they consider such long-run features
as the endogeneity of reserves or the endogeneity of deposit development dates as we do in
this paper.
In the textbook formulation of a supply function, producers take the price as given
and choose production to maximize profits. In this paper, supply at any given date and
location depends on exogenous prices over time and at various locations. We distinguish
between short-run and long-run supply functions according to whether reserves (the total
production to be dispatched) are given or endogenous (McFadden, 1978), and we study the
fundamental properties of these functions.
When total cumulative production is given, an exogenous price change occurring at any
date modifies the marginal profit from extracting at that date relative to other dates and
thus entails a pure intertemporal substitution effect; this is the mechanism of the green para-
dox as initially formulated by Long and Sinn. A change in the resource price path faced by
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producers may also affect ultimately exploited reserves. We call this the stock-compensation
effect and we show in Section 2 that the substitution effect dominates the compensation
effect under standard assumptions. Consider an increase in price at some particular date
leaving prices at all other dates unchanged; the pure intertemporal substitution effect in-
creases supply at that date and reduces supply at all other dates; the stock effect results in
an increase in ultimately extracted reserves. It follows that supply at the date of the price
rise increases as the stock effect and the substitution effect work in the same direction; this
is the NRR version of the law of supply. At all other dates, since the substitution effect
dominates, it follows that supply diminishes despite the stock effect; this may be called the
law of intertemporal substitution in NRR supply.
When the time dimension is combined with a space dimension as in Fischer and Salant
(2013), the same result applies to a price change occurring at a point in space and time. Thus
the intertemporal substitution effect is accompanied by an analogous spatial substitution
effect: A price rise at any point in space and time reduces supply at all other points.
The dependence on a vector of prices, as well as the substitution and compensation
effects are reminiscent of demand theory: NRR producers allocate a stock of resource to
different dates and outlets in a way that is comparable to the way consumers allocate their
income to different expenditures on different goods. The time space and spatial space play
a similar role as the good space in static demand. The stock of reserves is not unlike the
budget constraint in demand theory, as both limit what can be allocated to alternative
supplies or to expenditures on alternative goods; furthermore, these constraints are both
affected by prices, although by different channels.1 The law of supply always applies: Unlike
the Giffen paradox, the supply of a NRR always increases if its price rises. Similarly, inferior
goods have no counterpart in NRR supply: Given a price vector, supply does not diminish
at any date if reserves are exogenously increased.
The production to be dispatched or the reserves to be extracted are costly and must
1As is well known, the analogy between supply and demand is not an isomorphism; for one thing
preferences are price independent unlike profits.
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be constituted prior to dispatching or extraction. We assume that the stock of reserves is
produced via exploration and development efforts that are sensitive to the rent accruing to
the extractor during the exploitation phase. This is how prices at any date and location
determine initial reserves in the long run and cause both the stock compensation and the
substitution effect mentioned earlier. Furthermore, the constitution of reserves is necessarily
subject to decreasing returns to scale as exploration prospects are finite. If such were not
the case, NRRs would be indefinitely reproducible like some conventional commodities are
in the long run. The resource rent would reduce to the constant quasi-rent associated with
expenditures in exploration and reserve development, which would be insensitive to NRR
prices. In that case, long-run supply at any date and location only depends on prices at that
date; there are no intertemporal cross-price effects and supply is intertemporally separable.
It is customary to use the apparatus of supply and demand to study policies. This
is the realm of partial equilibrium analysis. Applying this apparatus to NRR markets
requires taking into account the intertemporal nature of NRR supply and its properties. We
illustrate the procedure in Section 3 by first presenting three examples: resource taxation;
a reserve-sterilization policy; a demand-reduction policy. Then we generalize the procedure
to generic demand and supply policies, before considering policies with a spatial dimension
and with market power.
NRR extraction technologies are often peculiar; extraction costs may depend on past
cumulative extraction and may reflect spatial or geological constraints. We give due con-
sideration to such resource heterogeneity issues in Section 4, with details in the Appendix.
The output supplied remains homogeneous, but the conditions of its production may vary,
especially due to variations in the quality or accessibility of the reserves. We consider the
two major alternative approaches that have been used in the literature to deal with such
resource heterogeneity, each corresponding to a particular cost structure. One is the model
where the cost of extraction increases with cumulative extraction, under the assumption
that resources of easier access or higher quality are exploited first. Although the idea of
4
progressively rising costs was already present in Hotelling (1931), this model has first been
formalized by Gordon (1967), and further perfected among others by Weitzman (1976) and
Salant, Eswaran and Lewis (1983). It is being used in a recent literature that investigates
the green paradox (e.g. Gerlagh, 2011; Hoel, 2012; van der Ploeg and Withagen, 2012a,
2012b, 2014; Grafton, Kompas and Long, 2012). It is also invoked in the integrated as-
sessment model of Golosov et al. (2014). In variants associated with the energy literature
(Adelman, 1990, 1993) such as Venables (2014), extraction costs increase with the rate of
depletion and are “iceberg,” using up the stock of reserves itself.
The second approach to resource heterogeneity, which may be attributed to Herfindahl
(1967), considers a multiplicity of different deposits; it has given rise to a series of pa-
pers that study the optimum sequence and possible overlap of deposit exploitation (e.g.
Amigues, Favard, Gaudet and Moreaux, 1998; Gaudet and Lasserre, 2011; Salant, 2013).
In the version analyzed here, deposits have different costs of extraction and different costs
of exploration and development; the timing of deposit development and exploitation is
endogenous and is part of the producer’s supply problem.2
Again we show that the substitution effect dominates the stock compensation effect
under both approaches, although the result takes a somewhat diluted form. In the Gordon
model with stock effects, we show that both the stock and the substitution effect materialize
in terms of cumulative supply at all dates and locations although not necessarily in terms
of supply flows. In the multiple-deposit model, we consider supply at individual deposits
and also aggregate supply. In the long run, a change in supply occurs when the flow of
production from an existing deposit changes; but supply may also change when a deposit
is left undeveloped rather than being exploited or vice versa. It is shown that a price rise
at any date after the planned opening of a deposit either leaves the opening date of that
deposit unchanged, or postpones it but never accelerates it. Meanwhile it causes extraction
from deposits already in production to diminish before the price rise. Thus at the aggregate
2In the computable version of their integrated assessment model, Golosov et al. (2014) use three deposits
with different costs of extraction and no (reserve) stock effect on these costs. They also assume reserves to
be exogenous.
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level, the substitution effect is reinforced and dominates the stock compensation effect until
at least the first new, postponed, opening date. Over that initial period, supply is always
reduced following an increase in future price.
We conclude by putting the results in perspective, reiterating their theoretical and policy
relevance, and highlighting their applicability to all commodities that must be produced
prior to being dispatched in space or time.
2 A Synthetic Theory of Non-Renewable Resource Supply
2.a A Simple Model
A quantity xt ≥ 0 of a NRR is supplied at each of an infinite countable set of dates
t = 0, 1, 2, ... The initial stock X > 0 of the resource is finite and treated as exogenous at
this stage, with
∑
t≥0
xt ≤ X . The present-value producer price is denoted by pt ≥ 0. The
stream of prices p ≡ (pt)t≥0 is taken as given by the producers and treated as exogenous at
this stage.3 The present-value cost of producing a quantity xt is denoted by Ct(xt), where
the function Ct may be time varying, is increasing and twice differentiable, and satisfies
C ′′t (xt) > 0. For simplicity, we also assume
4 Ct(0) = 0 for all dates t ≥ 0 and C
′
t(0) < pt for
at least one date so that some exploitation is warranted.
The stock of reserves to be exploited does not become available without some prior
exploration and development efforts. Although exploration and exploitation often take
place simultaneously at the aggregate level (e.g. Pindyck, 1978, and Quyen, 1988; see
Cairns, 1990, for a comprehensive survey of related contributions), at the microeconomic
level of a deposit they occur in a sequence, as in Gaudet and Lasserre (1988) and Fischer
and Laxminarayan (2005). This way to model the supply of reserves is particularly adapted
to the problem under study because it provides a simple and natural way to isolate the
effect of an anticipated price change on the size of the exploited stock at the firm level.
3We will show how the results carry over to a partial-equilibrium setting where prices are endogenously
determined on markets.
4The qualitative results follow through in presence of a fixed cost or lump sum tax.
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Specifically, assume that the present-value cost E(X) of developing an initial, exploitable
stock X at date 0 is twice differentiable, increasing, strictly convex, and satisfies E(0) = 0
and E ′(0) = 0. The property E ′(0) = 0 that the marginal cost of reserve development is
zero at the origin is introduced because it is sufficient to ensure that a positive amount of
reserves is developed. It thus rules out uninteresting situations where resource prices do
not warrant the production of any reserves.
Since the development of reserves is costly, the optimum plans of the producers will
always bind the exhaustibility constraint. In other words, leaving part of the developed stock
ultimately unexploited does not maximize cumulative net discounted revenues. For a given
price sequence p, the cumulative value function corresponding to a producer’s optimum is
max
(xt)t≥0,X
∑
t≥0
(ptxt − Ct(xt))− E(X) (1)
subject to ∑
t≥0
xt = X. (2)
Denoting by λ the Lagrange multiplier associated with constraint (2), the necessary
first-order conditions characterizing the optimum extraction path are
pt − C
′
t(xt) ≤ λ with (pt − C
′
t(xt)− λ) xt = 0, ∀t ≥ 0. (3)
At dates when extraction is strictly positive, we have
pt − C
′
t(xt) = λ, ∀t ≥ 0, xt > 0. (4)
Otherwise, pt−C
′
t(xt) ≤ λ for all xt ≥ 0, i.e., equivalently, pt−C
′
t(0) ≤ λ, and xt = 0; indeed,
if the price is too low at some date, production may be interrupted before exhaustion, and
start again once prices are high enough.5 For the choice of initial reserves, the first-order
5The condition for supply interruptions must also hold after exhaustion.
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condition is
E ′(X) = λ. (5)
Expression (4) is the Hotelling rule stating that the marginal profit from extraction must
be constant in present value over the period of active exploitation, equal to λ, the unit
present value of reserves underground, called the Hotelling scarcity rent. (5) is a standard
supply relationship that sets marginal cost equal to price. The price in this case is the unit
scarcity rent and is defined implicitly; in other words reserves are the output of a production
process whose technology is described by the cost function E. However reserves are not
like conventional goods that can be produced under constant returns to scale, because of
the scarcity of exploration prospects. The supply of reserves is thus a strictly increasing
function of the rent:6
X = X(λ) ≡ E ′−1(λ). (6)
The Hotelling rule (4) implicitly defines the solution of Problem (1)-(2) as a series of
functions xt giving extraction at each date when it is strictly positive: Each function
xt = xt(pt, λ), ∀t ≥ 0. (7)
is strictly increasing in the current price pt and strictly decreasing in the rent λ. During
supply interruptions or after exhaustion, extraction is given by the same function, which
then takes a null value. As Sweeney (1993) noted, functions like (7) can be interpreted as
conventional static supply functions, whose only arguments are the price pt of the extracted
resource and the reserve price λ. However λ is not a conventional price; unlike standard
price parameters, it corresponds to the “shadow” or implicit valuation of reserve units and
thus is endogenous to the resource producer problem. Formulating regular supply functions
consequently further requires expressing the rent λ as a function of the vector of exogenous
6The finiteness of exploration prospects amounts to a fixed factor being imposed on the production
process. Hence reserves are produced under rising marginal costs.
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prices p.
2.b Short-Run (Restricted) NRR Supply Functions
Treating the stock of initial reserves as given at this stage and combining all relations (7)
into (2), we obtain that the rent is a function increasing in all prices in p ≡ (pt)t≥0 and
decreasing in the stock X ; we will denote that function with a tilde, and will do so for all
functions of given reserves:
λ = λ˜(p,X). (8)
Note that λ˜ is strictly increasing in pt when extraction xt is strictly positive. Otherwise
a price change at a date when supply is interrupted may leave the rent unchanged. Sub-
stituting (8) into (7) gives the restricted supply functions (McFadden, 1978), one at each
date:7
xt = x˜t(p,X) ≡ xt
(
pt, λ˜(p,X)
)
, ∀t ≥ 0. (9)
These functions do not make use of the first-order condition for initial reserves. Conditional
on the initial reserve stock X and given the sequence p of prices, they determine how the
suppliers allocate extraction from the stock to different dates. Unlike the restricted supply
of a conventional good which only depends on its own price and on the quantity of some
factor, the restricted NRR supply function at t further depends on resource prices at all
other dates. This is so despite the fact that the same standard technological assumptions
hold in the NRR and the conventional good cases: The extraction cost at one date does
not depend here on the extraction cost at another date, just as the cost of producing a
conventional good is independent of the cost of producing another good.
Hotelling’s lemma is obtained from the optimized value function by use of the envelope
theorem for constrained problems. That is, substituting (9) and (8) into the Lagrangian
7A standard restricted supply function depends on the output price, on the prices of variable factors,
and on the quantity of at least one restricted factor. Here variable-factor prices are the prices of the factors
entering the extraction technology, omitted from the notation for simplicity, and the restricted factor is the
initial stock of reserves.
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function associated with Problem (1)-(2) and differentiating with respect to pt, while holding
the restricted level of X and its multiplier as well as all extraction rates constant, gives the
restricted supply at t.8
The restricted NRR supply function x˜t for any date t ≥ 0 is increasing in X . Holding the
reserve level unchanged, consider the partial effects of prices, that is the direct price effects.
x˜t(p,X) is increasing in pt and decreasing in any pT , T 6= t. This can be shown as follows.
By (9), ∂x˜t(p,X)
∂pT
=
∂xt(pt,λ˜(p,X))
∂pT
+ ∂xt(pt,λ)
∂λ
∂λ˜(p,X)
∂pT
, where the first term on the right is zero
unless T = t, as xt(pt, λ) is not directly dependent on prices other than the contemporary
price. The second term is clearly negative whether T = t or T 6= t since xt decreases in λ
while ∂λ˜(p,X)
∂pT
is clearly positive since a rise in the resource price at any date cannot reduce
the rent. It follows that ∂x˜t(p,X)
∂pT
is negative for T 6= t while a contemporary rise in price
involves two effects working in opposite directions. However, if extraction diminishes at all
dates t 6= T , it must increase at t = T for otherwise reserves would not be exhausted, which
would be suboptimal as already discussed: The law of supply also applies to restricted
supply. Consequently, in case of a contemporary price rise, the direct price effect given by
the first term must dominate the second term that operates via the resource rent.
The effects just established are obviously non-zero if they involve dates when exploitation
is active. To sum up, if xt > 0, then restricted supply x˜t(p,X) is strictly increasing in X
and in pt; if, furthermore, xT > 0, T 6= t, it is strictly decreasing in pT . Otherwise, stock or
price changes may leave extraction unchanged, so that the above effects may in general be
zero. The same will be true all along the paper for all effects that we will examine. For the
sake of brevity, we will establish stock and price effects regardless of whether extraction is
strictly positive or interrupted at the dates these effects involve, and, therefore, we will not
repeat the above conditions under which they become non-zero.
8Hotelling’s lemma is obtained similarly in the case of non-restricted supply functions defined further
below. The non-restricted value function is obtained by replacing the restricted level of X and the rent λ
by their optimized values X∗(p) and λ∗(p) defined shortly below.
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2.c Long-Run (Unrestricted) NRR Supply Functions
Consider the choice of initial reserves. While (6) is a standard stock supply relation, the
price λ is not a standard exogenous price but an endogenous variable. The supply of reserves
at the producer’s optimum in Problem (1)-(2) can be expressed as a function of exogenous
prices. The value of the unit rent at the producer’s optimum satisfies λ = λ˜(p,X). By
(6), the optimum amount of reserves satisfies X = X(λ) = X
(
λ˜(p,X)
)
, which implicitly
defines X and λ as functions of p:
X = X∗(p) and λ = λ∗(p) ≡ λ˜ (p,X∗(p)) . (10)
Thus the supply of reserves depends on the whole sequence of resource prices, although this
can be summarized into one single rent.9
Restricted supply or factor demand as well as restricted cost or profit functions are
usually interpreted as representations of the short run. In the long run, the restricted factor
is variable. This interpretation is adequate here, exploration and reserve development being
analogous to capital investment. Just as capital goods are produced, reserves in (10) are
the outcome of a production process. Then they are used as a factor of production in the
resource production process that generates the restricted supply (9).10
The optimal (unrestricted) NRR supply functions are defined as
x∗t (p) ≡ x˜t
(
p,X∗(p)
)
, ∀t ≥ 0. (11)
Like the restricted supply, the (unrestricted) supply of a NRR differs from a conventional
9As before, factor prices are omitted for notational simplicity from the reserve-supply function. They
are the prices of the factors entering the extraction process because they affect the optimum rent, but also
the prices of the factors entering the exploration and development process which are omitted arguments of
the E cost function.
10Although this is not usually modeled, capital does get depleted (worn out) by production at a rate that
depends on the rate of production. However conventional capital can be replenished in a plant while this
is not, or only partially, true of the reserves of a mine. On the related subjects of resource substitution
and sustainability, see the huge literature initiated with the 1974 Symposium of the Review of Economic
Studies.
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supply function under identical standard technological assumptions in that it not only
depends on its own price, the current price, but also on the prices at all other dates.
The comparative static properties of NRR supply are thus defined over a wider set of
variables than those of a conventional supply function. With conventional supply functions,
attention is usually limited to the law of supply, the effect of a change in the price of the
good supplied.11 With NRR, supply cross-price elasticities, the effect on supply at t of
changes in prices at other dates, are also of theoretical interest: As we shall see, they obey
their own law.
The resource literature has seldom considered such exogenous price changes, and never
in a systematic treatment of supply. One exception is Burness (1976) who forced prices to
be constant in current value and investigated the effect on production of a simultaneous
change in all prices. Another exercise frequent in the resource taxation literature (e.g.
Dasgupta, Heal and Stiglitz, 1981) has been to ask what time profile of taxes would be
neutral. Both Burness’ and Dasgupta, Heal and Stiglitz’s findings result from the following
property of the restricted NRR supply function. Let A ≡ (a)t≥0 be a vector of equal
constants a. Assume that a > −λ˜(p,X) for some given level X . Then it is easily shown
that λ˜(p + A,X) = λ˜(p,X) + a and x˜t(p + A,X) = x˜t(p,X); if a is a unit tax such as a
unit severance tax, this shows that the tax is neutral if it is constant in present value. This
result does not extend to the unrestricted supply function, when initial reserves are allowed
to adjust (Gaudet and Lasserre, 2013). Indeed, if a < 0 so that λ˜(p+A,X) < λ˜(p,X), the
initial reserve level is lower at prices p + a by (6) so that the NRR supply at all dates is
reduced.
Let us now turn to standard comparative supply analysis: What is the effect of a change
in price at date T on supply at date t? One must distinguish between a change at the same
date T = t and a change at T 6= t. From (11), this decomposes into a direct price effect
11We ignore factor prices for simplicity.
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and a stock compensation effect :
∂x∗t (p)
∂pT
=
∂x˜t (p,X
∗(p))
∂pT
+
∂x˜t (p,X
∗(p))
∂X
∂X∗(p)
∂pT
. (12)
When T = t, the total price effect may be called the own price effect ; since x˜t is increasing
in both pt and X , and as resource prices always affect developed reserves positively, the
own price effect is positive. Expression (12) when T = t indicates that the law of supply
holds and illustrates the Le Chaˆtelier principle, which says that the long-run (unrestricted)
elasticity is higher than the short-run (restricted) elasticity.
When T 6= t, the direct price effect in (12) may be called the pure substitution effect as it
reflects the reallocation of an unchanged reserve stock to extraction at a date different from
T ; (9) makes clear that this substitution effect only arises via the effect of the rent on the x˜t
function: ∂x˜t(p,X)
∂pT
= ∂xt(pt,λ)
∂λ
∂λ˜(p,X)
∂pT
. Also by (9), the stock compensation effect works in the
opposite direction and can be itself decomposed into ∂x˜t(p,X)
∂X
∂X∗(p)
∂pT
= ∂xt(pt,λ)
∂λ
∂λ˜(p,X)
∂X
∂X∗(p)
∂pT
so that the total cross-price effect can be factorized as follows:
∂x∗t (p)
∂pT
=
∂xt (pt, λ
∗(p))
∂λ
[
∂λ˜ (p,X∗(p))
∂pT
+
∂λ˜ (p,X∗(p))
∂X
∂X∗(p)
∂pT
]
, T 6= t, (13)
where the term between brackets is in fact the total derivative of λ˜(p,X) with respect to
pT , decomposed into a direct price effect at constant initial reserves, and the effect on the
rent of the change in initial reserves induced by the price change. Resource prices at all
dates affect the rent positively, i.e. ∂λ
∗(p)
∂pT
≥ 0, ∀T .12 Consequently,
∂x∗t (p)
∂pT
=
∂xt (p, λ
∗(p))
∂λ
∂λ∗ (p)
∂pT
≤ 0, ∀t 6= T, (14)
12Formally, the definition of X∗(p) = X
(
λ˜ (p,X∗(p))
)
yields ∂X
∗(p)
∂pT
=
X′(λ)
∂λ˜(p,X∗(p))
∂pT
1− ∂λ(p,X
∗(p))
∂X
X′(λ∗(p))
, implying
that the term between brackets in (13) can be factorized as ∂λ
∗(p)
∂pT
= ∂λ˜(p,X
∗(p))
∂pT
(
1
1− ∂λ˜(p,X
∗(p))
∂X
X′(λ∗(p))
)
,
which is positive since ∂λ˜(p,X)
∂X
is negative. By (10), it also follows that ∂X
∗(p)
∂pT
is positive.
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implying that the stock compensation effect is never high enough to offset the pure substi-
tution effect.13
2.d Properties of Homogeneous NRR Supply
Besides the law of supply that characterizes the own-price effect, our analysis has established
two properties that are specific to NRR supply functions: the stock effect, and the cross-
price effect. Subsections 4.a and 4.b will show how those results carry over from the simple
context of this section to settings that are considered richer and more realistic but less
intuitive in the literature.
Proposition 1 (Supply from a homogeneous single-outlet NRR deposit)
1. Stock effect: An exogenous rise in exploitable reserves increases short-run (restricted)
supply at all dates.
2. Cross-price effects: A price rise at any date T reduces short-run (restricted) supply
and long-run (unrestricted) supply at all dates t 6= T .
Although reminiscent of the decomposition of Marshallian demand, the decomposition
of the change in NRR supply at t following a price change at T 6= t into a pure substitution
effect and a stock compensation effect is not isomorphic to the Slutsky decomposition.
The substitution effect and the stock compensation effect of a resource price change are
illustrated in Figure 1 for the case of two periods, which corresponds to the two-good
representation of demand theory. Assuming prices p0 and p1, point O = (x0, x1) in Figure 1
depicts the producer optimum. Given a stock of reserves X , periods 0 and 1 extraction levels
13We have assumed decreasing returns to the development of reserves – increasing marginal cost of
development, i.e. strict convexity of the cost function E. This assumption reflects the finiteness of extraction
and exploration prospects and is essential to the result. Suppose on the contrary that the development of
reserves were subject to constant returns to scale: E(X) = eX . As before, λ would give the present value
of each reserve unit so that λ = e. The rent, thus determined by the technology, would then be insensitive
to variations in prices p, and resource supply at t would only depend on current resource price by (9).
Constant returns to scale in the development of X make all cross-price effects on extraction vanish, just
like in the classical theory of supply under separable costs.
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are chosen such that the producer reaches the highest possible two-period iso-extraction-
profit curve for prices (p0, p1) (of level pi).
14 The optimum allocation (x0, x1) is thus at
the point of tangency between the pi iso-profit curve and the exhaustibility constraint, the
−45 degree line which expresses the trade-off between quantities extracted in period 1 and
quantities extracted in period 2 in such a way that x0 + x1 = X . Unlike the case of
Marshallian demand, the slope of this linear constraint is not affected by changes in prices.
Also, while prices do not affect iso-utility curves, they affect the slope of iso-profit curves:
Iso-profit curves may cross at different prices.
O
O˜
O′
x0 x0
x1
x1
x˜1
x′1
x˜0 x
′
0
pi
pi
pi′
X
X ′
Figure 1: Price effect decomposition with p′1 > p1
Consider a rise in p1 to p
′
1 > p1. The price change implies that all iso-profit curves
become flatter at any given feasible level of x0. If the stock of reserves remains unchanged
at X , the new tangency point is along the same exhaustibility constraint and along the
iso-profit curve of level pi > pi, at point O˜ above O, so that x˜0 < x0 and x˜1 > x1. The move
14In Figure 1, the iso-profit curves correspond to the two-period extraction profit, conditional on X and
before deduction of the sunk exploration cost E(X): pi = (p0x0 − C0(x0)) + (p1x1 − C1(x1)). By (4), any
optimum extraction is such that pt−C
′
t(xt) = λ. Thus in a neighborhood of any optimum, pt−C
′
t(xt) > 0.
In a neighborhood of an optimum, it follows from the convexity of Ct that the slope −
p0−C
′
0(x0)
p1−C
′
1(x1)
of any
iso-profit curve at prices (p0, p1) is negative, increasing in x0 and decreasing in x1. In Figure 1, we focus
on the relevant convex parts of the iso-profit curves. On other parts, they need not be convex.
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from O to O˜ represents the substitution effect.
However the rise in price leads producers to increase reserve development to X ′. Taking
this stock effect into account brings the new optimum to O′. It is clear that x′1 > x˜1 > x1.
Unlike the Slutsky decomposition, there is no possibility of a commodity analogous to a
Giffen good, whose supply would diminish as a result of a rise in its price. Moreover, in the
case of NRR supply, the substitution effect always dominates the compensation effect, so
that, by (14), x′0 must be lower than x0 following the rise in p1. There is no such thing as
NRR supply complements; quantities extracted at different dates are always substitutes.
2.e Spatial NRR Supply
For simplicity, we have focused so far on the dynamic interpretation of the NRR supply
model. However, to the countable set of dates t = 0, 1, 2, ... we may add a spatial dimension
indexed by l = 0, 1, 2, ..., l¯; in that formulation, the price ptl is the present-value producer
price at date t and location l. Location may then refer to a particular country or jurisdiction
characterized by a particular price sequence, or an outlet commanding particular marketing
efforts or transportation costs. The net spot revenue from selling the amount xtl at location
l at date t is ptlxtl−ctl(xtl), where the function ctl(xtl) gives the cost of selling specifically in
location l at t; it may be a transportation cost, a marketing cost, etc. It is assumed that ctl
is increasing and strictly convex. The net spot revenue from serving all locations l = 0, ..., l¯
at date t is
∑
l=0,...,l¯
(ptlxtl − ctl(xtl)) − Ct(xt), where xt =
∑
l=0,...,l¯
xtl is the quantity of NRR
extracted from the deposit at date t and the function Ct(xt) gives the cost of extracting
and otherwise processing this quantity before dispatching it to all locations l = 0, ..., l¯.
The cumulative value function corresponding to a producer’s optimum allocation of the
production, for a given matrix of prices, is
max
(xt)t≥0,(xtl)t≥0,l=0,...,l¯,X
∑
t≥0
 ∑
l=0,...,l¯
(ptlxtl − ctl(xtl))− Ct(xt)
−E(X), (15)
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not only subject to the exhaustibility constraint (2) as previously in Subsection 2.a, but
also to the constraint ∑
l=0,...,l¯
xtl = xt, ∀t ≥ 0. (16)
Defining υt as the Lagrange multiplier associated with the new constraint (16) and
keeping the notation λ for the multiplier associated with the exhaustibility constraint (2),
the necessary first-order conditions characterizing the producer’s optimum are
ptl − c
′
tl(xtl) = υt, ∀t ≥ 0, ∀l = 0, ..., l¯, (17)
for the allocation of the production at any date t to all locations l, and
υt − C
′
t(xt) = λ, ∀t ≥ 0, (18)
for the choice of extraction at date t. For simplicity, and with no consequence on the sign
of the price effects to be established, we focus here on interior resource allocations where
xtl > 0. The choice of initial reserves is determined by the same condition (5) as previously.
Condition (18) is the counterpart of (4) in the single-location model of Subsection 2.a,
except that the implicit value υt plays the role of the price at date t in the determination of
the rate of extraction. υt can be interpreted as the after-extraction resource rent, i.e. the
implicit value of the inventory to be dispatched. Condition (17) plays the role of allocating
production to outlets by equalizing the contributions to υt from the various locations. The
analysis then unfolds as in the single-location treatment of Subsections 2.a-2.d, but in two
stages rather than one, as follows.
The allocation rule (17) implicitly defines the solution as a series of functions giving the
optimal quantity at each date and location
xtl = xtl(ptl, υt), (19)
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with the same properties as the functions defined by (7). The rule (18) similarly defines
the total quantity across locations at each date t as a function
xt = x¯t(υt, λ). (20)
The functions x¯t have properties with respect to the implicit value υt and the rent λ that
are analogous to those of (7): x¯t is increasing in the implicit price υt and decreasing in the
rent λ.
Treating date-t extraction xt to be dispatched across locations as given – in the same
way as we took reserves X to be allocated across dates as given in Subsection 2.a –, and
combining all relations (19) into (16), we obtain the new multiplier υt as a function in-
creasing in all components of the vector of date-t prices pt ≡ (ptl)l=0,...,l¯ and decreasing in
xt:
υt = υ˜t(pt, xt). (21)
Substituting (21) into (20) yields an implicit function identical to (7)
xt = xt(pt, λ), (22)
except that pt is a vector rather than a single price.
A rise in pTL, i.e. a rise at any date T ≥ 0 and location L ∈ [0, ..., l¯], causes the rent
λ to increase. This is true whether the size of the exploitable reserves X is restricted or
not. Thus, by (22), extraction decreases at all dates t other than T . When reserves X are
endogenous, they increase as a result of the price rise; since all xt are reduced at all t 6= T ,
it follows that xT must increase if the sum of all xt is to use up reserves.
According to (19), quantities xtl at all locations react in the same direction to the same
change in implicit value υt. Since xt =
∑
l=0,...,l¯
xtl, the reduction in xt at t 6= T is only
compatible with a rise in υt. Thus xtl decreases for all t 6= T and all l.
At date T where xT increases as a result of the rise in pTL, (20) makes clear that only
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a rise in υT is consistent with the increase in λ. The rise in υT in turn implies by (19) that
xT l diminishes for all l 6= L. Since, total extraction xT at date T rises, it must be that xTL
rises as a result of the price rise, which illustrates the law of supply for this spatio-temporal
version of the model.
Proposition 2 (Supply from a homogeneous multiple-outlet NRR deposit)
1. Stock effect: An exogenous rise in exploitable reserves increases short-run supply at
all dates and locations.
2. Cross-price effects: A rise in price pTL at any date T and location L reduces short-run
and long-run supply at all locations l 6= L at date T , and at all locations l at dates
t 6= T .
In Section 3, we illustrate how the properties of NRR supply functions can be used to
analyze policies in partial equilibrium. For ease of exposition, we do so using the supply
functions characterized in the simple setup of this section. We will only consider more
complex setups later, in Subsections 4.a and 4.b, and show that the qualitative results on
supply functions and partial equilibrium analysis are almost unchanged.
3 Partial Equilibrium and Policy Analysis
Having defined and characterized NRR supply functions in the standard way opens the
field of all applications that rely on the demand-supply schedule, in particular the partial
equilibrium analysis of economic policies. Policy-induced changes are more complex than
the above analysis of supply for two main reasons. First, the policy often affects equilibrium
prices indirectly, because it affects the demand for, or the supply of, the NRR; second,
policy-related price changes usually take place over an extended period rather than at a
single date.
Three examples are provided below: one on supply extraction taxation; one of a reserve-
reduction policy; and one of a policy affecting demand and raising the issue of the green
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paradox. The equilibrium is determined by the intersection of supply with demand, and
the supply properties established in Section 2 are used to assess the equilibrium effects
of changing a policy at some date. These examples illustrate general partial-equilibrium
properties of NRR markets that are gathered in Proposition 3 at the end of this section.
The issue of policy duration and timing is covered in a final corollary while the section ends
with a discussion of market power.
3.a The Taxation of Extraction
Suppose that prices are determined by the equilibrium of NRR demand and supply and
consider a policy that penalizes supply, such as the taxation of extraction. Let net after-tax
spot extraction revenues be Πt(xt, pt) = ptxt − Ct(xt) − Gt(xt, pt), where Gt(xt, pt) is the
present-value tax function (Gaudet and Lasserre, 2013). When the tax is a unit or specific
severance tax, Gt(xt, pt;αt) = αtxt; when it is an ad valorem severance tax, Gt(xt, pt; βt) =
βtptxt. When policies combine those taxes, Gt(xt, pt;αt, βt) = (βtpt + αt)xt and after-
tax extraction revenues may be rewritten Πt(xt, pt;αt, βt) = [pt(1− βt)− αt] xt − Ct(xt).
Therefore, the analysis of Section 2 is only modified to the extent that the producer price in
absence of supply taxation should be replaced by the after-tax producer price pt(1−βt)−αt.
Assume that date-t demand xDt (pt) is strictly decreasing. For simplicity, let us focus
on a specific tax αT ≥ 0 applied at some date T ≥ 0 and only at that date: αt = 0,
∀t 6= T . The partial-equilibrium implications of raising the tax from zero to αT > 0 are
depicted in Figure 2 where points IT and It represent the initial situation at dates T and
t respectively. Prices pet , t ≥ 0, denote pre-tax equilibrium prices. Initially assuming that
prices at dates t 6= T are unchanged, date-T supply is reduced to x∗T (pT − αT , (p
e
t )t6=T )
(Figure 2(a)). If demand were perfectly inelastic, peT would increase by exactly αT leaving
the producer price peT −αT unchanged. Demand being downward sloping, p
e
T varies by less
than the tax change, so that the producer price decreases from peT to p
e
T (αT ) − αT < p
e
T .
A lower producer price at date T reduces the quantity supplied at T but also contributes
to a positive shift in the supply curves at all other dates t 6= T by Proposition 1, and thus
20
to a drop in price at these dates. In turn, at any date t′ 6= T , reduced producer prices at
other dates t also different from T further reinforce the upward shift in the supply curve
(Figure 2(b)). Fully adjusted prices pe′t are thus lower and quantities supplied are higher
than before the tax at all dates t 6= T . It follows that there is a feedback at T which shifts
supply up to x∗T
(
pT − αT , (p
e′
t )t6=T
)
. Yet, the latter upward shift in date-T supply does not
compensate the initial downward shift: Indeed, when reserves are fixed as in the short-run,
the increase in quantities at all other dates t 6= T implies that supply must decrease at date
T ; in the long-run, exploitable reserves are lowered by the tax, so that extraction at date
T is further reduced.
xT
xeT
αT
xe′T
xDT (pT )
x∗T
(
pT , (p
e
t )t6=T
)
x∗T
(
pT − αT , (p
e′
t )t6=T
)
x∗T
(
pT − αT , (p
e
t )t6=T
)
pTpeT p
e′
T p
e
T (αT )
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(a) Date T of tax increase
xt
xet
xe′t
xDt (pt)
x∗t
(
pt, p
e
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e
t′)t′ 6=T,t
)
x∗t
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e′
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)
x∗t
(
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e
T (αT )− αT , (p
e
t′)t′ 6=T,t
)
ptpetp
e′
t
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(b) Any date t 6= T
Figure 2: Partial-equilibrium effects of extraction taxation
3.b Reserve-Reducing Policy
Consider a supply policy that aims at reducing exploitable reserves X , for example in the
spirit of Harstad (2012) by buying up and sterilizing some of these reserves. If initial ex-
ploitable reserves were fixed, resource supply would be directly given by restricted functions
x˜t(p,X) defined by (9), that are all increasing in reserves according to Proposition 1. Thus
any policy that reduces reserves from a level X to X ′ = X−Ω causes production to diminish
at all dates. Partial-equilibrium implications are obvious, as illustrated in Figure 3 where
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point It represents the initial situation at date t. At all dates t ≥ 0, instantaneous supplies
x˜t(p,X) meet instantaneous downward-sloping demands x
D
t (pt) and determine equilibrium
prices pet . For a change in exploitable reserves from X down to X
′ occurring at date zero,
consider the market at any particular date t ≥ 0. For unchanged prices pet′ at dates t
′ 6= t,
date-t supply is shifted down to x˜t (pt, (p
e
t′)t′ 6=t, X
′), causing a rise in the equilibrium price.
Since lower supplies at all other dates t′ 6= t similarly increase all equilibrium prices pet′ ,
supply curves at all dates are further shifted down. Fully adjusted equilibrium prices at
all dates are pe′t′ ≥ p
e
t′ , with equality if demand is infinitely elastic, and date-t supply curve
becomes x˜t (pt, (p
e′
t′ )t′ 6=t, X
′), lower than x˜t (pt, (p
e
t′)t′ 6=t, X
′).
xt
xet
xe′t
xDt (pt)
x˜t (p,X)
x˜t (pt, (p
e′
t′ )t′ 6=t, X
′)
x˜t (pt, (p
e
t′)t′ 6=t, X
′)
ptpet p
e′
t
It
Figure 3: Partial-equilibrium effects of reserve reduction
When reserves are endogenous, reserve reduction may be partly compensated by the
development of new reserves. In that case, the supply of exploitable reserves X(λ) defined
by (6) is shifted down to X (λ) − Ω. For a more general supply-reduction policy whose
stringency is indexed by Ω, the reserve supply function is redefined as X (λ; Ω), with ∂X
∂λ
> 0
and ∂X
∂Ω
< 0.15 Intuition suggests, and Proposition 3 will confirm, that an increase in the
15For example, suppose that exploitable reserves are reduced by an exogenous, policy induced, demand
for reserves XD(λ; Ω), decreasing in λ and increasing in the stringency index Ω. Then, the reserve supply
function becomes X(λ; Ω) ≡ E′−1(λ) −XD(λ; Ω) ≤ E′−1(λ).
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policy’s stringency from Ω to Ω′ > Ω results in a greater equilibrium rent λe′ > λe and in
lower equilibrium reserves Xe′ < Xe. Thus whether the reserve reduction is compensated
(endogenous reserves) or not (restricted reserves), instantaneous supplies are reduced at all
dates, and the partial-equilibrium implications of a rise in Ω are qualitatively the same as
those of a fall in X described by Figure 3.
Harstad addresses this problem first as a static problem; then in a two-period framework.
He also considers that reserves come in different deposits of varying quality that are not in
production when they are purchased. We deal with resource heterogeneity and endogenous
production periods in Subsections 4.a and 4.b.
3.c Demand-Reducing Policy
Consider now a policy that reduces the demand for the NRR during the periods over which
it is implemented. Assume that the demand xDt for the resource at date t ≥ 0 does not
only depend on the date, on the resource price pt at that date, but also on the stringency at
date t of NRR demand-reducing policies, synthesized by the index θt. NRR demand may
thus be written16 xDt (pt; θt) and assumed continuously differentiable and decreasing in both
arguments, where θt = 0 means the absence of any demand-reducing policy. The path of
the policy stringency index Θ ≡ (θt)t≥0 is exogenously given.
Assume that a demand-reducing policy is implemented at date T and only at that date,
so the index θT rises from 0 to θT > 0 while θt = 0, ∀t 6= T ; the partial-equilibrium effect
is depicted in Figure 4. Prices pet , t ≥ 0, denote equilibrium prices with θT = 0. When the
policy is implemented, the demand at date T shifts down. Initially assuming that prices
at dates t 6= T are unchanged, date-T supply function does not change so that the drop in
demand induces a move of date-T equilibrium down along the supply curve. The producer
price peT is reduced to p
e
T (θT ) < p
e
T ; quantity x
e
T is reduced accordingly (Figure 4(a)).
A lower producer price at T causes the supply curves at all other dates t 6= T to shift
16An increase in θt at any date t may reflect policy-induced technical change, an increase in resource
consumption taxation, an increase in subsidies to substitutes, or any combination of such resource demand-
reducing policies.
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up by Proposition 1, resulting in a drop in price at these dates. In turn, reduced producer
prices at dates t′, also different from T , further reinforce the upward shift in the supply
curve at t (Figure 4(b)). Thus fully adjusted prices pe′t are lower and quantities supplied
are higher than before the policy implementation at all dates t 6= T . It follows that there is
a feedback at T which shifts supply up to x∗T
(
pT , (p
e′
t )t6=T
)
. This reinforces the initial drop
in the price at T while also causing an increase in quantity (Figure 4(a)). However, this
quantity response only partially offsets the initial downward reduction in quantity along the
supply curve. Indeed, when reserves are fixed as in the short-run, the increase in quantities
at all dates t 6= T implies that extraction must decrease at T ; and in the long-run, as
shown in Section 2, exploitable reserves are lowered by the demand-reducing policy, so that
extraction at T diminishes more than in the short run.
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Figure 4: Partial-equilibrium effects of demand reduction
3.d Generic NRR Supply and Demand Policies
The illustrations given above are simple examples. For more general applications, generic
supply and demand policies can be modeled as follows; their effects are described in Propo-
sition 3 further below.
A demand policy indexed by θt may reduce date-t demand for the NRR to x
D
t (pt; θt)
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from its no-intervention level xDt (pt; 0). Demand-reducing policies may take various forms,
such as consumer taxes or support to NRR substitutes. Assuming that xDt is continuously
differentiable and monotonic in both arguments, the inverse demand function at t, Pt(xt; θt)
is decreasing in xt and in θt. In the sequel we will assume that stringency levels are chosen
such that Pt(0; θt) is greater than the equilibrium price p
e
t for some dates, to avoid situations
where policies do not warrant any production at all.
A supply policy may aim at extraction while affecting reserves only indirectly; or it may
focus on reserves directly. We will refer to the former as extraction policy, while calling
the latter a reserve policy. An extraction policy indexed by ξt reduces date-t marginal
extraction profit pt − C
′
t(xt) −
∂Gt(xt,pt;ξt)
∂xt
, where the policy function Gt is positive and
such that the policy-adjusted cost function Ct + Gt inherits the properties of the original
cost function: It is increasing, strictly convex and twice differentiable in xt; it also satisfies
Ct(0)+Gt(0, pt; ξt) = 0 for all t ≥ 0, pt > 0 and ξt, and is such that C
′
t(0)+
∂Gt(0,pt;ξt)
∂xt
is lower
than the equilibrium price pet for at least one date where Pt(0; θt) > p
e
t also holds. Last,
it is assumed that ∂
2Gt
∂xt∂pt
< 1 to eliminate ill-conceived policies under which marginal cost
would increase more than marginal revenue as a result of a price increase. We define a more
stringent extraction policy as one that reduces the marginal extraction profit: ∂
2Gt
∂xt∂ξt
> 0,
∀xt ≥ 0. Modified this way, Problem (1)-(2) yields necessary conditions
xt = xt(pt, λ; ξt), ∀t ≥ 0. (23)
As their counterparts in (7), the new functions (23) are increasing in pt and decreasing in
the rent λ; they are further decreasing in the extraction policy index ξt.
Next, a reserve-reducing policy increases the marginal cost of developing exploitable
reserves. The exploration and development cost E(X) in Problem (1)-(2) is augmented by
the function F (X ; Ω), positive and increasing in its two arguments, where Ω reflects the
stringency of the reserve-reducing policy. As in Section 2, assume that the total development
cost E(X) + F (X ; Ω) is twice differentiable, strictly convex and satisfies E(0) + F (0; Ω) =
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E ′(0) + ∂F (0;Ω)
∂X
= 0. Modifying Problem (1)-(2) accordingly, the necessary reserve-supply
condition (5) is replaced by E ′(X)+ ∂F (X;Ω)
∂X
= λ, which implicitly defines the policy-induced
level of reserves as
X = X(λ; Ω). (24)
As its counterpart (6), this function is increasing in the rent λ; it is further decreasing in
the reserve-policy index Ω. The NRR producer’s supply behavior is summarized by the
functions (23) and (24).
At this stage of the formalization in Section 2, the remaining step toward establishing
supply functions was to replace the endogenous rent λ by an appropriate function of para-
metric prices. In the current partial equilibrium analysis, prices are endogenous but one
must recognize the dependency of λ on both the supply and the demand policy parameters.
This is done as follows.
For any date t ≥ 0, substituting the inverse demand function Pt(xt; θt) into the supply
function (23) implicitly defines date-t equilibrium extraction as a function
xt = x̂
e
t (λ; ξt, θt), ∀t ≥ 0. (25)
This function is decreasing in the rent λ, in the extraction-policy index ξt, and in the
demand-policy index θt.
Treating the stock of initial reserves as given at this stage, and combining relations (25)
at all dates into the exhaustibility constraint (2) defines the short-run equilibrium rent as a
function λ˜e(X ; Ξ,Θ) of initial reserves, of the vector of extraction-policy indices Ξ ≡ (ξt)t≥0,
and of the vector of demand-policy indices Θ ≡ (θt)t≥0. As its counterpart (8), λ˜
e(X ; Ξ,Θ)
is decreasing in X ; it can be shown that it is also decreasing in all elements of the policy
vectors Ξ and Θ.
Substituting λ˜e(X ; Ξ,Θ) into each extraction function (25) gives the restricted (short-
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run) NRR equilibrium extraction functions:
xt = x˜
e
t (X ; Ξ,Θ) ≡ x̂
e
t
(
λ˜e(X ; Ξ,Θ); ξt, θt
)
, ∀t ≥ 0. (26)
Each restricted NRR equilibrium extraction function is increasing in initial reserves X .
Holding X unchanged, the partial effects on equilibrium supply at t of changing policy
intensities ξT and θT at any date T ≥ 0 can be established as in Section 2’s analysis of the
effects of changing the price pT on restricted supply. The only difference is that a rise in
ξT or θT (a policy restriction) affects the quantity supplied in a direction opposite to that
of a rise in price.17
Now consider the long term, allowing initial reserves to be endogenously determined.
Substituting λ˜e(X ; Ξ,Θ) into (24), implicitly defines long-run equilibrium reserves
X = Xe(Ξ,Θ,Ω). (27)
In turn, substitutingXe(Ξ,Θ,Ω) into λ˜e(X ; Ξ,Θ) defines λ = λe(Ξ,Θ,Ω) ≡ λ˜e (Xe(Ξ,Θ,Ω); Ξ,Θ).
It can be shown that Xe is decreasing in ξt and θt, for all t ≥ 0, as well as in Ω, and that
λe is decreasing in ξt, in θt, for all t ≥ 0, but increasing in Ω. The unrestricted (long-run)
equilibrium extraction level at date t is thus defined as the following function of all elements
in the policy vectors Ξ and Θ as well as the policy index Ω:
xet = x
e
t (Ξ,Θ,Ω) ≡ x˜
e
t (X
e(Ξ,Θ,Ω); Ξ,Θ) . (28)
The short-run equilibrium extraction functions (26) and the long-run equilibrium ex-
traction functions (28) just established have the same comparative static properties with
17For example consider an increase in θT at any date T ≥ 0. By the definition (26) of the x˜
e
t restricted
functions, extraction at all dates t 6= T is only affected via the policy-induced change in the rent λ˜e in x̂et ;
λ˜e is reduced as a consequence of the rise in θT , which in turn, by (25), increases x̂
e
t , for all t 6= T , and thus
x˜et , for all t 6= T . Extraction being increased at all dates t 6= T while exploited reserves are unchanged,
equilibrium extraction must decrease at the date T of the policy change. The same analysis applies to a
change in the supply-policy stringency ξT .
27
respect to the exogenous (supply and demand) policy parameters, mutatis mutandis, as
their NRR supply counterparts have with respect to the exogenous prices. This can be
shown by adapting the steps followed in Section 2. In particular, the effects of supply- and
demand-reducing policies on equilibrium extraction quantities can be decomposed into a
stock compensation effect and a pure substitution effect as illustrated by (12) in the case of
the price effect in Section 2. Those properties are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 (Policy-induced equilibrium changes on a single-outlet homogeneous-
NRR market)
1. A reserve-reducing policy decreases short-run and long-run equilibrium extraction at
all dates t ≥ 0.
2. Any combination of extraction and demand-reducing policies at any date T
(a) (Stock effect) reduces long-run developed reserves;
(b) (Contemporary-price effect) reduces short-run and long-run extraction at date
T ;
(c) (Cross-price effects) increases short-run and long-run extraction at all dates t 6=
T .
Proposition 3 focuses on the equilibrium of a single-outlet homogeneous-NRR market.
It can be readily extended to multiple-outlet markets using the formalization leading to
Proposition 2.18
3.e Policy Effects over Extended Periods and Areas
The results stated in Proposition 3 can be used to study the effects of policies that reduce
NRR demand and/or supply over some extended future period and in specific locations via
18A proof is available from the authors upon request.
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various forms of restrictions to NRR extraction and use, or assistance to alternative sources
of supply.
Consider an increase in policy stringency at several dates T that form a set ∆. Proposi-
tion 3.2 establishes that such increases in policy stringency have the same qualitative effect
on equilibrium NRR quantities at dates when no policies are implemented. Thus all effects
combine to positively affect extraction at all dates t /∈ ∆.
When policies are unanticipated and not accompanied by any adjustment in the stock of
reserves, they affect the restricted equilibrium supply x˜et (X ; Ξ,Θ); when they are anticipated
and associated with a drop in developed reserves, they affect the unrestricted equilibrium
supply xet (Ξ,Θ,Ω). In either case, reductions for example in demand at T ∈ ∆ increase
extraction at all t /∈ ∆, confirming the validity of the green paradox.
If the policy change occurs at a single date as in Proposition 3.2, the drop in price
unambiguously causes a drop in extraction at that date. When ∆ contains more than a
single date, the reaction of NRR extraction at each T ∈ ∆ depends on the magnitude of the
price change occurring at that date relative to the changes occurring at other dates T ′ ∈ ∆.
However, the above analysis indicates that cumulative extraction over ∆ is reduced. This
is because X decreases while cumulative supply at all dates t /∈ ∆ increases.
Corollary 1 (Policy-induced equilibrium changes over extended periods)
An extraction or demand-reducing policy implemented at dates T ∈ ∆
1. (Stock effect) reduces long-run developed reserves;
2. (Contemporary-price effect) reduces short-run and long-run cumulative extraction
over dates T ∈ ∆;
3. (Cross-price effects) increases short-run and long-run extraction at all dates t /∈ ∆.
As suggested already, extraction leakages (Fischer and Salant, 2013; Gaudet, Moreaux
and Salant, 2001) work in the same direction spacewise, and timewise, in the short run
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and in the long run.19 When the change in demand affects more than one region as with
Fischer and Salant’s (2013) technology-oriented policies, or takes place at more than one
date as with their emission taxes, the reaction of resource supply to one region at one date
depends on the magnitude of the price change occurring in that region and date relative to
the changes occurring at other regions and dates. At dates and regions not concerned by
the policies, short-run and long-run supply increases.
3.f Market Power
A firm that enjoys market power on the NRR market solves Problem (1)-(2) while taking
into account the incidence on prices of its quantity decisions: Marginal profits on the left-
hand side of (4) become, instead of pt −C
′
t(xt), pt − xt
dpt
dxt
−C ′t(xt). Although prices are no
longer exogenous, they are affected by exogenous policy parameters in a known way. Hence
policies may be modeled as in Subsection 3.d.
On the production side, the treatment is unchanged. A short-run extraction policy
indexed by ξt raises date-t marginal extraction cost to C
′
t(xt)+
∂Gt(xt,pt;ξt)
∂xt
, where the policy-
adjusted cost function Ct + Gt exhibits the properties established in Subsection 3.d; and
similarly, the exploration and development cost E(X) is augmented by the function F (X ; Ω)
as above.
On the demand side, policy parameters θt reduce the inverse demand for the NRR at
t from the no-intervention level Pt(xt; 0) to Pt(xt; θt). The difference with the competitive
case treated in Subsection 3.d is that a meaningful demand policy must not only be such
that Pt(xt; θt) is decreasing in θt but such that the marginal revenue
∂Pt(xt;θt)xt
∂xt
exhibits the
same property. For equilibrium supplies to be well defined, the analysis further requires
that net revenue Pt(xt; θt)xt − Ct(xt)−Gt(xt, pt; ξt) be strictly concave in xt.
Provided these conditions are satisfied, the impact of policies on short-run and long-run
extraction and on the stock of developed reserves is thus determined by functions with
19The spatial version of Corollary 1 can be established using the formalization of Proposition 2; a proof
is available from the authors on request.
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the same properties as (26), (27) and (28) when the producer has market power. In other
words, Proposition 3 applies with no further restriction than the above concavity in xt of
profits.
4 Heterogeneous Resources
Non-renewable resources are notoriously heterogeneous. This heterogeneity is mostly man-
ifest in the costs involved in discovering, developing, and extracting the resource, as well
as transforming it into a homogeneous commodity. The seminal intuition of Herfindahl
(1967) known as the “least-cost-first” principle has given rise to a substantial, sometimes
controversial, literature.20
One strand of literature considers that industry NRR supply consists of contributions
from individual deposits and studies the sequence of their exploitation. It stems directly
from Herfindahl’s initial contribution showing that deposits of constant but different unit
costs of extraction were to be exploited in a strict sequence. As was later established,
simultaneous exploitation of different deposits may be optimal when marginal costs depend
on extraction rates or capacities are limited or costly to acquire (see, e.g. Amigues et al.,
1998; Gaudet and Lasserre, 2011; Salant, 2013). The least-cost-first principle may further
fail, most notably when deposits differ in size. In this multi-deposit approach, resources are
homogeneous within a deposit and heterogeneity results from differences between deposits.
An alternative way to model NRR was formalized by Gordon (1967) and further dis-
cussed or refined by Weitzman (1976), Levhari and Liviatan (1977), Pindyck (1978), Salant
et al. (1983) and Sweeney (1993); it was used recently by Gerlagh (2011), Hoel (2012), van
der Ploeg and Withagen (2012a, 2012b, 2014), Grafton et al. (2012), and Golosov et al.
20As Slade (1988) puts it “The idea that the least-cost deposits will be extracted first is so firmly embedded
in our minds that it is an often-made but rarely tested assumption underlying the construction of theoretical
exhaustible-resource models” (p. 189). The particular notion of cost involved and context of analysis are
further subject to appreciation (Kemp and Long, 1980). Are the costs inclusive of resource rents or not
(Hartwick, 1978; Amigues and Moreaux, 2002)? Are the relevant costs short-run costs or long-run costs
(Hartwick et al., 1986)? What variables, extraction rates and reserve levels most importantly, determine
extraction costs? Does an industry cost function exist or should costs be measured at the deposit level?
31
(2014) in works related to resource taxation and the green paradox. By assumption, the
cost of extraction increases with cumulative extraction under the rationale that least-cost
resources are used first irrespective of the deposit from which they are extracted.21 Reserves
may be left underground if and when the unit extraction cost is not met by the price, which
implies that prices affect the level of economic reserves. Although the original paper of
Gordon argues that the increase in extraction costs with cumulative extraction occurs at
the firm level as well as in the aggregate, Gordon’s postulate is often implicitly assumed
to apply across deposits at the industry level implying that the relevant stock of reserves
is the industry aggregate stock and that the corresponding cost function is an aggregate
industry cost function.22
We show how the properties of NRR supply established in Section 2 carry over when
the resource is heterogeneous, whether heterogeneity takes the form of inter-deposit hetero-
geneity as in the branch of literature that stems from Herfindahl’s initial paper, or takes
the form of intra-deposit heterogeneity as in the tradition initiated by Gordon where re-
serve stocks affect extraction costs. Consider the latter first, in the next subsection; we will
deal with multiple deposits in a subsequent subsection, where we also make opening dates
endogenous.
4.a Gordon Model: Stock Effects in Extraction Costs
Since the resource is not homogeneous, it is important to make a distinction between geo-
logical and economical reserves. Let Xt represent the stock of geological reserves remaining
at t, and relabel the stock of initial geological reserves X0, with X0 = X
0. Units of measure-
ment are chosen such that the flow of extraction is homogeneous over time, e.g. barrels of
oil of constant energy content, viscosity, refining cost, etc. Cumulative extraction between
21As a matter of fact Hotelling (1931, p. 152) refers to such a concept but is not usually credited for it.
22A related modeling approach has its roots in the energy literature and finds its most recent expression
in Venables (2014). Resources not only differ in their cost of extraction, but the ultimate amount that
may be recovered at a cost below some specified cut-off level may depend on the speed at which extraction
proceeds.
32
dates 0 and t is equal to X0 −Xt, with
Xt+1 = Xt − xt, X0 = X
0 given.
The extraction cost function may be written as Ct (xt, Xt). Under such a techno-
geological constraint on extraction, the net present-value extraction revenue ptxt−Ct (xt, Xt)
not only depends on xt and pt as in Section 2, but also on remaining reserves Xt. It is still
true at each date t that ∂Ct(x,X)
∂x
> 0 and Ct(0, X) = 0, ∀X ≥ 0. Also, we assume that
∂Ct(0,X0)
∂x
< pt for at least one date so that some exploitation is warranted. The dependency
of extraction cost on cumulative extraction implies that the cost depends on X negatively:
Higher current reserves imply lower cumulative extraction, hence a lower cost. We assume
∂Ct(x,X)
∂X
< 0 and
∂Ct(x,X)
∂x∂X
< 0, (29)
for all t ≥ 0 and for all x > 0 and X ≥ 0.
We also assume that Ct (x,X) is strictly convex in its two arguments.
23 We owe James
Sweeney (1993) a thorough investigation of the discrete version of the Hotelling-Gordon
model; as he showed, the existence of an underlying continuous-time representation of the
technology implies restrictions on the partial derivatives of allowable discrete-time cost
functions; precisely, it must be true that
∂2Ct (x,X)
∂x2
+
∂2Ct (x,X)
∂x∂X
> 0, (30)
a property called the dominance of extraction rate on marginal cost24 which will also be
23Under the maintained assumption that the cost function is convex, the objective function for this
problem is concave and the feasible set is convex. Thus the first-order necessary conditions are sufficient for
optimality and multiple local unconnected optima cannot exist (Sweeney, 1993, p. 771). We further assume
the strict convexity of the cost function in order to avoid having to deal with supply correspondences rather
than supply functions.
24Salant et al. (1983) also imposed this assumption, although not in reference with any underlying
continuous-time technology.
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assumed to hold here.25
As in the simple model of Section 2, the producer must identify and develop the reserves
to be exploited before extraction begins. A portion X0 − XF is chosen within the initial
stock X0 of geological reserves and undergoes a costly exploration and development process
that makes it suitable for exploitation. No development expenditure is applied to reserves
that are not deemed economical, implying that the stock XF ≥ 0 of geological reserves left
undeveloped will be left unexploited at the end of the extraction process.
The amount X0−XF defines economic reserves. Economic reserves can be increased at
date zero by reducing XF . It is sensible to assume decreasing returns to exploration and
development on the ground, as argued before, that the best prospects are developed first.
Redefining the function E, we thus assume that the cost of developing an initial stock of
exploitable economic reserves X0−XF when geological reserves are X0 is E
(
X0 −XF
)
,26
with E(0) = 0 and E ′(0) = 0.27
The problem faced by a NRR producer under such conditions is (see the Appendix for
details of the resolution)
max
(xt,Xt)t≥0
∑
t≥0
(ptxt − Ct(xt, Xt))−E(X
0 −XF ) (31)
25As a simple way to focus on the rise in extraction cost with cumulative extraction, the extraction cost
of the underlying continuous-time cost function is sometimes assumed to depend on the remaining-reserve
stock, but not on the extraction rate (e.g. van der Ploeg and Withagen, 2012a among many others);
i.e. total cost is assumed linear in extraction rate. However, this linearity assumption in a continuous-
time model implies a discrete-time representation in which marginal extraction cost is a strictly increasing
function of extraction rate and a decreasing function of the remaining stock (Sweeney, 1993). Thus the
discrete-time model presented here encompasses both continuous-time versions of Gordon’s model that
treat the marginal cost of extraction as constant or as strictly rising.
26We write the amount of reserves developed for exploitation as X0 − XF rather than merely X as in
Section 2 in order to emphasize an important property of the model. The marginal unit of reserves being
developed at date zero is the unit that will be extracted last, not first. In models of homogeneous resources,
this does not matter; in Gordon’s model, the sequence of reserve development and extraction is a geological
and technological assumption, although it is often justified on economic grounds. Increasing the stock of
developed reserves at date zero means reducing the amount of geological reserves XF to be left unexploited
at the closure date. As a result, the cost of extraction at date zero is the same whatever the amount of
developed reserves.
27As in Section 2, the property E′(0) = 0 is introduced because it is sufficient to ensure that a positive
amount of reserves is developed. It plays no other role than ruling out uninteresting situations where
resource prices do not warrant the production of any reserves.
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subject to
Xt+1 = Xt − xt, ∀t ≥ 0, (32)
xt ≥ 0, ∀t ≥ 0, (33)
X0 = X
0 given (34)
Xt ≥ X
F ≥ 0, ∀t ≥ 0, (35)
where economic reserves X0 − XF , and thus also geological reserves XF left undeveloped
at the end of exploitation, are fixed in the short run but endogenous in the long run.
We denote by S, which may be infinite, the last date at which strictly positive extraction
occurs. Thus if S exists, Xt = Xt+1 for all t ≥ S + 1. Clearly, extraction may also be null
occasionally before S.
Because of resource heterogeneity, the present-value resource rent measured by the La-
grangian multiplier associated with (32) is not constant over time. It is sometimes called a
Ricardian resource rent and diminishes as reserves diminish; we denote it µt rather than λ,
the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the same constraint in Section 2, to emphasize
that this rent is different from a pure Hotelling scarcity rent.
Pure scarcity arises in this model at two levels, associated with the two inequality
constraints in (35). The right-hand side inequality addresses the possibility that the totality
of geological reserves be worth exploiting. It has been well investigated (e.g. Levhari and
Liviatan, 1977) and will be considered only in the Appendix. The left-hand side inequality
recognizes the assumption that only those reserves that have been previously discovered
and developed at date zero may be exploited. As already argued, exploration and reserve
development are costly, so that no reserves are developed to be ultimately left unexploited.
Prior to the exhaustion of economic reserves, Xt > X
F and the constraint is not binding;
at the date of exhaustion, the constraint becomes binding and we denote the associated
multiplier by λ with no time index because the date of exhaustion S is endogenous; λ
may be interpreted as the pure Hotelling component of the resource rent in a short-run
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perspective, or, in a long-run perspective, as a quasi-rent reflecting both pure Hotelling
scarcity and expenditures sunk in exploration and development.
The first-order condition for strictly positive extraction at date t is
pt −
∂Ct(xt, Xt)
∂x
= µt, xt > 0, ∀ t = 0, ..., S. (36)
The resource rent evolves according to the first-order condition
µt = µt−1 +
∂Ct(xt, Xt)
∂X
, ∀ t = 0, ..., S, (37)
with
µS = λ and λ = E
′
(
X0 −XF
)
in the long run if XF > 0. (38)
According to (37), the present-value rent diminishes as the stock of reserves diminishes
and extraction cost increases. At the end of operations, all pre-developed reserves are
exhausted so that remaining geological reserves equal XF . When those remaining reserves
are not null, the constraint that XF ≥ 0 is not binding and the resource rent equals the
cost of finding and developing the marginal unit of economic reserves, as stated by the
right-hand equality in (38).
The following proposition characterizes the effect on restricted supply of a change in
restricted reserves, and the effect on restricted and unrestricted supply at any date of
a change in price occurring at any other date of the exploitation phase. They are the
counterpart, in the context of the Hotelling-Gordon model, of Proposition 1 which applies to
a homogeneous resource. As in Proposition 1, intertemporal cross-price effects are negative,
whether reserves are endogenous or not; the impact of a price change on reserves does not
dominate the direct substitution effect. However, this result holds in terms of cumulative,
rather than instantaneous, supply.28
28Thus the results of Section 2 hold in terms of cumulative supply when extraction costs change with
the stock of remaining reserves. They hold in terms of flows at date zero, the current date of extraction of
the planning horizon. Indeed, from the present perspective of the producer, current supply and cumulative
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Proposition 4 (Supply from a heterogeneous NRR deposit)
1. Stock effect: An exogenous rise in exploitable reserves increases short-run cumulative
supply at all dates.
2. Cross-price effects: A price rise at any date T ≤ S reduces short-run and long-run
cumulative supply at all dates t 6= T , where cumulative supply if t > T is defined to
exclude the supply at date T .
Proposition 4 concerns the individual deposit. The model with stock effects is also
widely used at the aggregate level which raises several issues. For instance, the consistency
of the Gordon model at the aggregate level requires the existence of an aggregate reserve
stock.29
In fact resource heterogeneity is manifest in differences between deposits – differences
in size, exploration and development costs, and extraction costs mostly – probably more
than in within-deposit differences. In the next section, we deal with multiple deposits that
differ from one another, but are individually homogeneous as in Section 2. Both the date
at which they enter into production and the size of the reserves at which they do so are
endogenous. The multiplicity of heterogeneous sources requires that supply be examined
both at the level of the individual deposit and in the aggregate.
4.b Multiple Deposits with Endogenous Production Periods
As just argued, it is preferable to construct aggregate NRR supply as the sum of sup-
plies from distinct individual deposits. We do so in this subsection, where we consider a
multiplicity of different deposits identified by j, developed at endogenous dates τ j , and
contributing to the supply of a unique resource whose price is pt. Each deposit is similar to
the single deposit considered in Section 2. However deposits differ by their size Xj, their
supply are identical.
29According to Livernois and Uhler (1987) “if the sign of the relationship between the aggregate reserve
base and aggregate extraction costs is ambiguous, then these models have very little to predict about the
nature of optimal exploration or the likely shape of price paths.”
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geology, location and depth or quality, as reflected in the technologies underlying both ex-
traction costs Cjt and exploration costs E
j
t as well as in the evolution of these technologies
over time. Were opening dates exogenous as in Section 2, Proposition 1 would imply that
current supply diminishes as a result of a rise in price at any future date T > 0, for each
deposit already developed, hence also at the aggregate level.
There are various possible supply sources j = 1, ..., J (deposits, developed or not) that
may contribute to resource supply. At date t ≥ 0, let aggregate resource supply be
St =
J∑
j=1
xjt , (39)
where xjt ≥ 0 is the current supply of resource j. Net spot extraction revenues are ptx
j
t −
Cjt (x
j
t ), where the cost C
j
t has the same properties as in the single-source case of Section
2. Since xjt may be zero, there is no loss of generality in assuming that the same set of
dates applies for all sources. Each source is constrained by its own finite reserve stock. As
the marginal reserve unit of any deposit will only be developed if it is to be exploited, that
constraint binds:30 ∑
t≥0
xjt = X
j , j = 1, ..., J. (40)
Each source is characterized by its own exploration and development cost Ejt (X
j), expressed
in present value, whose qualitative properties are the same as in the case of a single resource,
with the following minor difference. The property Ej ′t (0) = 0 for some appropriate t is only
assumed for one deposit to ensure that some reserves production is warranted; otherwise
Ej ′t (0) ≥ 0, so that a resource whose marginal exploration and development cost is too
high for profitability need not be developed. However the same deposit that is not economic
at some early date may be developed when prices become higher or when the technologies
encompassed in the functions Cjt and E
j
t justify it.
31 We assume that technological progress
30If deposit j is never developed, its developed reserves are trivially zero so that
∑
t≥0
x
j
t = 0 = X
j.
31For some price and technology combinations, development occurs only at τ = 0 if at all. Such is the case,
for example, if (present-value) prices are non increasing while (present-value) extraction and development
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on exploration and development is such that, for any date t′ > t and initial reserves Xj ≥ 0,
Ejt
(
Xj
)
≥ Ejt′
(
Xj
)
and Ej ′t
(
Xj
)
≥ Ej ′t′
(
Xj
)
, ∀j. (41)
As before, it is supposed that exploration and development are instantaneous and under-
taken only once for each deposit; extraction may take place only after deposit development.
All potential producers face the same given known price stream. For source j, the producer
solves
max
(xjt )t≥0,X
j ,τ j
∑
t≥0
(
ptx
j
t − C
j
t (x
j
t )
)
− Ej
τ j
(Xj) (42)
subject to (40) and to
xjt = 0, t < τ
j . (43)
The development date τ j ≥ 0 for deposit j is free. Suppose that τ j > 0. No production
occurs before that date, so that xjt = 0, t < τ
j . We further assume that the evolution
over time of resource price changes and extraction technology is such that, once initiated,
production is not interrupted until exhaustion.32 We also assume that the problem is well
behaved in the sense that the optima being characterized are global rather than local, at
least in the neighborhood of the price vector under consideration. This rules out jumps
from one local maximum to another local maximum as a result of a small change in the
price vector. Clearly, the problems to be solved for each supply source are independent
of each other. Thus the sole difference with the one-resource case analyzed in Section 2
is the fact that all deposits need not be developed at date zero if at all. Roughly, given
a price path, resources whose extraction cost is higher and/or whose cost of exploration
and development is higher will be developed later. We are interested in aggregate resource
supply at dates t ≥ 0; in particular we want to determine how aggregate supply St reacts
costs are non decreasing.
32This assumption facilitates the analysis while it eliminates situations of only minor economic interest
such as temporary interruptions of production. It is satisfied if prices do not diminish too fast and tech-
nological change is such that extraction costs do not increase too fast over any part of the exploitation
period.
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to a change in price at T ≥ t. Since each component xjt of St is determined independently
of the others, consider deposit j in particular.
Supply from deposit j may be restricted in two ways. First, as in Section 2, the size of
reserves brought into production may be treated as exogenous; second the timing of deposit
development may be treated as exogenous. While conceptually any combination of these
two restrictions may apply, it seems to make more sense to consider that they apply in
a specific order: in the very long run, no restriction; in the medium run, the timing of
development is restricted but the size of reserves is endogenous; in the short run both the
development date and the size of reserves are given.
Suppose at this stage that the development date τ j is given (short/medium run). Then
the derivations and properties established in Section 2 for Problem (1)-(2) can be readily
adapted to Problem (42)-(40)-(43). There is one specific resource rent λj associated with
each deposit. If τ j = 0, the solution is identical to that of Section 2; if τ j > 0, xjt = 0 when
t < τ j and, for t ≥ τ j , the first-order conditions for the choice of the optimum extraction
path and initial reserves differ from (4) and (5) only by the inclusion of time and deposit
indexes:
pt − C
j ′
t (x
j
t ) = λ
j , ∀ t ≥ τ j ; (44)
Ej ′
τ j
(Xj) = λj . (45)
All properties of the supply functions established in Section 2 apply for each deposit, pro-
vided it is active at t.
Still holding τ j constant, j = 1, ..., J , consider the effect of an increase in price at date
T on date-t industry supply. All deposits developed at or before t contribute to St. In the
medium run, when the size of reserves in these deposits is a choice variable, all results from
Proposition 1.2 on unrestricted supply are valid. The effect on aggregate supply at date t
is the sum of the changes in the supply from all deposits such that τ j ≤ t: If t 6= T , an
increase in pT reduces extraction from all active deposits at t reducing total supply at t. If
t = T , a rise in pT increases the contribution from all deposits, thus increasing total supply
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at t.
Similarly in the short run, when both the size of exploitable reserves Xj and the date of
their development τ j are fixed, the properties of restricted supply stated in Proposition 1.1
and .2 apply. A greater stock of exploitable reserves in a deposit positively affects supply
from this deposit at all dates t ≥ τ j ; an increase in pT affects supply, at the deposit and at
the aggregate level, in the same direction as above for the medium run. These results are
gathered further below in Proposition 5.
In the long run, development dates τ j are allowed to adjust to a price change: Producers
not only control their reserve development efforts, but also the date at which those efforts
are made. The optimal choice of τ j by the producer of deposit j is denoted τ j∗(p). The
optimal development date of deposit j may be the corner solution τ j∗ = 0, or, if it is an
interior solution, τ j∗ is a non-zero integer within the set of possible dates. The Appendix
establishes the following lemma about the effect of a change in price on deposit-opening
dates.
Lemma 1 (Endogenous opening date of a NRR deposit)
A price rise at any date after the planned opening of a deposit either leaves the opening
date of the deposit unchanged, or postpones it to a date closer and anterior to the date of
the price rise;
A price rise at any date prior to the planned opening of a deposit either leaves the
opening date of the deposit unchanged, or accelerates it.
Consider a price rise at T > 0. Lemma 1 indicates that all deposits that were ac-
tive before T have unchanged or postponed development dates. Clearly for deposits with
unchanged development date the results just described for the medium run (development-
date restricted) carry over to the long run (unrestricted development date) so that their
combined production diminishes. For deposits whose development is postponed their pro-
duction becomes zero until the new development date, which is inferior or equal to T .
However it cannot be ruled out that their production in the new program at dates following
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the new development date might exceed their production at those dates under the initial
price. Consequently, it is certain that aggregate production diminishes from date zero until
the date of the first postponed deposit development if any.33 In particular, a price rise at
any date t > 0 always reduces aggregate supply at the present extraction date t = 0.34
These findings are gathered in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 (Aggregate supply from multiple heterogeneous NRR deposits)
1. Stock effect: An exogenous rise in exploitable reserves increases short-run (reserve-
restricted) aggregate supply at all dates.
2. Cross-price effects on short- and medium-run supply: A price rise at any date T re-
duces short-run (reserve and development-date restricted) aggregate supply and medium-
run (development-date restricted) aggregate supply at all dates t 6= T .
3. Cross-price effects on long-run supply: A price rise at any date T > 0 reduces long-
run (unrestricted) aggregate supply at all dates t 6= T of an initial period that extends
at least from date zero until the date of the first postponed deposit development. If the
functions Ej ′t are time autonomous, a price rise at T > 0 reduces long-run aggregate
supply at all dates t 6= T .
5 Conclusion
The supply of a NRR or any commodity that must be produced before being dispatched
over time and space differs from conventional supply in that supply functions then depend
on a vector of parametric prices rather than a single price. The inventory to be dispatched
or, in the case of NRR supply, the reserves to be extracted, may be given. In that case
33Formally, a price rise at T > 0 reduces supply from deposit j at all dates t 6= T if j is active at t in the
initial program (t ≥ τ j∗(p), where p is the initial price vector) in the two following cases:
1) the development date of the deposit is the same in the initial and new programs (τ j∗(p) = τ j∗(p′), where
p′ is the new price vector), implying that the deposit is still active at t after the price rise;
2) the deposit is inactive at t in the new program (τ j∗(p′) > t ≥ τ j∗(p)).
34In the Appendix we show that if the marginal cost of development functions Ej ′t are time autonomous,
then the restriction to the date of the first postponed deposit development no longer applies.
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supply consists in optimally allocating a given stock (inventory or reserves) over time and
space. The supply functions, called restricted because they are conditional on the given
factor, are then functions of the parametric prices prevailing at all dates and locations, as
well as the quantity of the restricted factor. This defines the short run. In the long run, the
stock of reserves (or the production inventory) is chosen endogenously at the beginning of
the exploitation period so that the (unrestricted) supply functions depend on prices only.
The beginning of the exploitation period may itself be endogenous, and we have shown how
this impacts aggregate supply.
While the commodities produced have been treated as homogeneous throughout the
paper, the restricted factor (reserves or inventories) has been allowed to be alternatively
homogeneous or heterogeneous. This is important in general and especially in the case of
NRRs. For instance, NRR reserves may vary in quality, accessibility, cost of discovery and
development, etc. This is also often important in the case of non-resource commodities
as conditions of production may vary according to origin or due to technological change
and other factors. The focus on NRRs stresses the mechanisms at work in presence of
heterogeneity and the resulting supply properties.
The law of supply is only one property of the supply functions that we have characterized.
This paper has focused on cross-price effects: the effect on supply at one date and location
of changes in prices at other dates or locations. They were decomposed into substitution
effects (across time or space) and long-run stock compensation effects.
The substitution effect (across time or space) is always negative. When a NRR is
homogeneous, it dominates the long-run stock compensation effect, which is positive. Con-
sequently both the short-run and the long-run cross-price effects are negative.
Besides filling a gap in the analysis of supply functions, this result confirms or provides
several policy results. We give the examples of resource taxation, supply control policies,
the green paradox, and leakage, giving generality to results usually discussed on the basis
of particular cases.
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More importantly, the highly-orthodox theoretical apparatus developed in the paper
extends the conventional treatment of competitive supply to commodities whose supply
is determined across time and space according to parametric prices defined at dates and
locations. By so doing, the paper extends to such supply situations the tool of partial
equilibrium analysis and the familiar method of assessing the effects of policies by analyzing
shifts in demand and supply curves.
In order to address NRR heterogeneity, we have relied on the two main approaches found
in the resource literature. When the stock of reserves affects extraction costs so that there
is intra-deposit heterogeneity, we find that the substitution effect again dominates the stock
compensation effect, though this result must be expressed in terms of cumulative supply
rather than flows. When heterogeneity is an inter-deposit feature, its effect on supply must
be investigated at the industry level. We have constructed industry supply as the sum of
contributions from individual deposits whose opening date and size are endogenous in the
long run. Considering a price increase occurring at some strictly positive date (the beginning
of the planning period being zero), we find that the date of opening of a deposit may only
be unchanged or postponed by the future price increase. Comparing the substitution and
the stock inventory effect at the aggregate level, we find that the former dominates the
latter over the first part of the planning period but may fail to do so after the first new
opening date of a deposit if any. However, when the cost of developing reserves of a new
deposit is stationary, the substitution effect always dominates as in the case of supply from
a single source.
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1.a Problem Statement and Preliminaries
The problem under investigation is (31)-(35). In this problem, (32) and (33) imply that
Xt+1 ≤ Xt for all t ≥ 0. Thus it is sufficient that (35) be imposed when t → ∞ or at
the highest date considered. Let us call X∞ the value of Xt at that date or its limit when
t→∞. Then (35) can be replaced by
X∞ ≥ X
F ≥ 0. (A.1)
We denote µt and ηt, the Lagrange multipliers respectively associated with date-t con-
straints (32) and (33); the Lagrange multipliers associated with X∞ ≥ X
F and XF ≥ 0 are
λ and ε. The Lagrangian is
L =
∑
t≥0
(ptxt − Ct(xt, Xt) + ηtxt)−E(X
0 −XF ) (A.2)
+
∑
t≥0
µt (Xt − xt −Xt+1) + λ
(
X∞ −X
F
)
+ εXF .
It must be maximized with respect to xt and Xt at all dates in both the long-run and
the short-run versions of the problem. In the long-run version it is also maximized with
respect to XF , resulting in the long-run supply and cumulative supply functions x∗t (p) and
X∗t (p). In the short-run version X
F , or equivalently developed reserves X0 −XF , is taken
as given, resulting in the short-run (or restricted) supply and cumulative supply functions
x˜t
(
p,X0 −XF
)
and X˜t
(
p,X0 −XF
)
.
L is strictly concave in XF by the convexity of E; L is strictly concave in xt and Xt by
the convexity of Ct; the latter means that
∂2Ct(x,X)
∂x2
,
∂2Ct(x,X)
∂X2
, and
∂2Ct(x,X)
∂x2
∂2Ct(x,X)
∂X2
−
(
∂2Ct(x,X)
∂x∂X
)2
, (A.3)
are all strictly positive for all t ≥ 0, for all X ≥ 0 and all x > 0.
Differentiating (A.2) with respect to xt and Xt gives the following first-order conditions:
µt − ηt = pt −
∂Ct(xt, Xt)
∂x
, ηt ≥ 0, xtηt = 0, ∀t ≥ 0 (A.4)
and
µt−1 = µt −
∂Ct(xt, Xt)
∂X
, ∀t ≥ 0. (A.5)
Let S be defined as the last date at which extraction is strictly positive; S is endogenous;
1
we assume for simplicity that S ≥ 1. Also for simplicity, we assume that x0 > 0.
35 Thus,
x0 > 0, xt ≥ 0, ∀t = 1, ..., S − 1, xS > 0 and xt = 0, ∀t > S, (A.6)
and, by (32),
Xt = XS+1, ∀t ≥ S + 1. (A.7)
Since the development of reserves is costly, the optimum plans of the producer will bind
the first exhaustibility constraint, X∞ ≥ X
F , in (A.1). Precisely, starting at t = S + 1,
Xt = Xt+1 by (A.7) so that Xt must reach X∞ = X
F at S + 1 if it is to equal XF at the
end of the program. Consequently,
Xt = X
F , xt = 0, ηt ≥ 0, ∀ t ≥ S + 1; (A.8)
Xt > X
F , xt ≥ 0, ηt ≥ 0, ηtxt = 0, ∀ t ≤ S. (A.9)
It follows from (A.4) that
µt = pt −
∂Ct(xt, Xt)
∂x
, xt > 0, ∀t = 0, ..., S, (A.10)
which is expression (36) in the text. If xt = 0, either
µt ≥ pt −
∂Ct(0, Xt)
∂x
, ∀t ≤ S, (A.11)
or
µt ≥ pt −
∂Ct(0, X
F )
∂x
, ∀t ≥ S + 1. (A.12)
Since Ct(0, X) = 0 for all X ≥ 0,
∂Ct(0,X)
∂X
= 0 for all X ≥ 0. Therefore, before S, (A.5)
implies
µt−1 = µt, if xt = 0, ∀t < S. (A.13)
Beyond S, since xt = 0, (A.5) reduces to
µt−1 = µt, ∀t ≥ S + 1. (A.14)
(A.5) is unchanged at t ≤ S when extraction is strictly positive:
µt−1 = µt −
∂Ct(xt, Xt)
∂X
, xt > 0, ∀t = 0, ..., S, (A.15)
which is expression (37) in the text.
Since, starting at t = S + 1, xt = 0 and Xt = Xt+1 by (A.6) and (A.7), the sum∑
t≥0
µt (Xt − xt −Xt+1) in the Lagrangian (A.2) reduces to
∑
t=0,...,S
µt (Xt − xt −Xt+1). Con-
35The proofs of this appendix extend to the case where the deposit is not exploited at date 0, or only
exploited at date 0. The results are also valid when S →∞.
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sequently, the Lagrangian may be rewritten
L =
∑
t≥0
(ptxt − Ct(xt, Xt) + ηtxt)− E(X
0 −XF ) (A.16)
+
∑
t=0,...,S
µt (Xt − xt −Xt+1) + λ
(
X∞ −X
F
)
+ εXF ,
where (A.7) also implies that XS+1 in the term µS (XS − xS −XS+1) equals X∞. It follows
that the first-order condition to the choice of X∞ requires the equality µS = λ. Since µt
remains constant starting at t = S by (A.14), we obtain
µt = λ, ∀t ≥ S (A.17)
This gives the equality on the left-hand side of (38) in the text.
When XF is treated as endogenous (long run) and the constraint XF ≥ 0 in (A.1) is
binding, the first-order condition associated with XF in (A.2) is36
E ′(X0) = λ− ε, XF = 0, λ > 0, ε ≥ 0; (A.18)
when XF > 0, it must satisfy
E ′(X0 −XF ) = λ, XF > 0, λ > 0, ε = 0. (A.19)
This establishes the right-hand-side equality in (38).
Let us define the short-run value function
V
(
p,X0 −XF
)
≡
∑
t≥0
(ptxt − Ct(xt, Xt)) , (A.20)
where xt and Xt are solutions x˜t
(
p,X0 −XF
)
and X˜t
(
p,X0 −XF
)
to the restricted
(X0 − XF fixed) version of Problem (31)-(35), i.e. satisfy (A.10), (A.11), (A.12), (A.13),
(A.14) and (A.15). V
(
p,X0 −XF
)
denotes the total present-value revenue derived from the
exploitation of the developed reserves X0 −XF . By standard interpretation,
∂V(p,X0−XF )
∂(X0−XF )
is the implicit value of the marginal extracted unit, which is also the implicit value λ of the
marginal developed reserve unit:
λ ≡
∂V
(
p,X0 −XF
)
∂(X0 −XF )
> 0. (A.21)
By the assumption of cost convexity, V is increasing and strictly concave in X0 −XF .
36Given our assumptions on prices and costs, a strictly positive stock of reserves X0 −XF is developed
and exploited. Thus E′(X0 −XF ) > 0, which will imply that λ > 0.
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In the long run, when XF is endogenous, so that (A.18) and (A.19) hold; it follows
E ′(X0) =
∂V (p,X0)
∂(X0)
− ε, XF = 0; ε ≥ 0, λ > 0;
E ′(X0 −XF ) =
∂V
(
p,X0 −XF
)
∂(X0 −XF )
, XF > 0, ε = 0, λ > 0.
When the constraint XF ≥ 0 on the availability of geological reserves is not binding,
reserves are developed in such a way that the cost of developing the marginal unit is equal
to the contribution of this unit to the intertemporal profit. However, in the case where the
marginal cost of developing the totality of geological reserves falls short of the value of the
marginal reserve unit, it is optimal to set XF = 0, with 0 < E ′ (X0) = λ− ε < λ.
In the short run, when X0−XF is given, (A.21) holds, but conditions (A.18) and (A.19)
are not necessarily satisfied.
1.b Proof of Proposition 4
1. Stock effect on restricted cumulative supply
Assuming that exploitable reserves X0 − XF are parametric, with XS+1 = X
F as per
(A.8), consider an increase d(X0 − XF ) > 0, i.e. a reduction dXF < 0 (X0 is given); this
requiresXF > 0. In the sequel, we establish the effect on the restricted supply and restricted
cumulative supply functions x˜t
(
p,X0 −XF
)
and X˜t
(
p,X0 −XF
)
of this exogenous reserve
increase; x˜t
(
p,X0 −XF
)
and X˜t
(
p,X0 −XF
)
are the values of Xt and xt in the solution
of Problem (31)-(35), whose Lagrangian is (A.2), when xt and Xt are endogenous but X
F
is exogenous.
The strict concavity of V in (A.21) implies that the rise in reserves causes a strict
reduction in λ. The final extraction date S may be modified as a result of the reserve
change. In what follows, we will denote by S the date at which extraction endogenously
stops once the reserve change is taken into account.
Notation 1 If S is modified by any parametric change, S denotes in these proofs the date
at which extraction endogenously stops once the parameter change is taken into account.
For example, if S changes from S0 to S1 as a result of a change in X
F from XF0 to X
F
1 ,
the notation xS signifies xS1 and dxS signifies xS1 |XF=XF1 − xS1 |XF=XF0 .
The proof makes use of several lemmas.
Lemma 2 As a result of a reserve change d(X0−XF ) > 0, dλ < 0, dµS < 0 and dXS+1 <
0.
 dλ < 0 is shown above.
If S is unchanged, µS = λ and XS+1 = X
F before and after the reserves’ change; the
lemma immediately holds in that case.
If S is postponed, for all t ≥ S, µt = µS = λ by (A.17) and Xt+1 = XS+1 = X
F , before
and after the change; the lemma also immediately holds.
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Examine now the case where S is advanced. Before the change, µt > λ by (A.15) and
Xt+1 > X
F for all t strictly preceding the initial last-extraction date; in particular at the
date S which will be the last extraction date after the change, remembering Notation 1,
XS+1 > X
F . After the change, since µS = λ and XS+1 = X
F while the change implies
dλ < 0 and dXF < 0, it follows that dµS < 0 and dXS+1 < 0. 
The following lemma will be used later to exploit Lemma 2.
Lemma 3 If, as a result of the increase in reserves, dµt ≥ 0 and dXt+1 ≥ 0 for some
t = 0, ..., S − 1, then dµt+1 ≥ 0 and dXt+2 ≥ 0.
 For some date t = 0, ..., S−1, assume that the change in reserves causes changes dµt ≥ 0
and dXt+1 ≥ 0.
If xt+1 was null and remains so as a result of the change in reserves, then µt+1 = µt by
(A.13); it follows that dµt+1 ≥ 0. Also, dxt+1 = 0 implies by (32) that dXt+2 = dXt+1 ≥ 0.
Consider now that xt+1 was strictly positive and remains so after the change, so that
(A.10) holds. Assume, as a premise to be contradicted, that dµt+1 < 0. On the one hand,
total differentiation of (A.10) at date t+ 1 then implies
dxt+1 >
−∂
2Ct+1
∂x∂X
∂2Ct+1
∂x2
dXt+1. (A.22)
On the other hand, totally differentiating (A.15) and (A.10), taken at t+1, and substituting
yield
dµt = −
[
∂2Ct+1
∂x2
+
∂2Ct+1
∂x∂X
]
dxt+1 −
[
∂2Ct+1
∂X∂x
+
∂2Ct+1
∂X2
]
dXt+1. (A.23)
The first term between brackets is strictly positive by assumption (30). Using (A.22), and
simplifying it follows that
dµt <
(
∂2Ct+1
∂x2
)−1 [(
∂2Ct+1
∂x∂X
)2
−
∂2Ct+1
∂x2
∂2Ct+1
∂X2
]
dXt+1,
where assumption (A.3) implies that the term multiplying dXt+1 is negative. Thus the
lemma’s assumption dXt+1 ≥ 0 implies that dµt < 0. This contradicts the other lemma’s
assumption dµt ≥ 0. We conclude that the maintained assumption dµt+1 < 0 cannot hold
and that dµt+1 ≥ 0 when xt+1 remains positive as a result of the change.
Consider finally the (intermediate) cases where extraction is zero before the reserve
change and becomes strictly positive as a result of the change, or vice versa, where extraction
is strictly positive and becomes zero. We just showed that dµt+1 ≥ 0 if extraction is null
and remains so, and also if extraction is strictly positive and remains so. By the Maximum
Theorem µt+1 is continuous across these cases, so that we also have dµt+1 ≥ 0.
37
37The Maximum Theorem applies as follows to the restricted problem under study. The exploitable
reserves parameter X0 − XF continuously affects the extraction possibility set defined by (32), (33) and
(35), and continuously affects the objective (31). Since X0−XF must be finite by (35) and by the finiteness
of X0, the extraction possibility set is bounded, and is evidently closed. Furthermore, the objective (31) is
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We have shown that dµt+1 ≥ 0; now consider dXt+2. Consider first that extraction
xt+2 was null before the reserve change and remains so after the change. In that case, (32)
implies that dXt+2 = dXt+1, which is positive as lemma assumption. Consider now that
extraction xt+2 was and remains strictly positive. In that case, (A.10) holds before and
after the reserve change, so that the rise dµt+1 ≥ 0 implies a reduction in
∂Ct+1
∂x
, that is by
total differentiation of (A.10)
dxt+1 ≤
−∂
2Ct+1
∂x∂X
∂2Ct+1
∂x2
dXt+1. (A.24)
By assumptions (29) and (30), the coefficient of dXt+1 in the above inequality is positive and
lower than unity. Thus the inequality implies that dxt+1 ≤ dXt+1, which yields dXt+2 ≥ 0.
The continuity argument made earlier to invoke the Maximum Theorem also applies here
for cases where extraction xt+2 becomes positive or null as a result of the change in reserves.

The combination of Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 will give the following result.
Lemma 4 As a result of the reserve increase, dµ0 < 0 and dX1 < 0, and for all t = 1, ..., S,
either dµt < 0 or dXt+1 < 0.
 This lemma follows from Lemma 2 and the contrapositive of the series of implications in
Lemma 3. Indeed, the final implication of Lemma 3 that µS ≥ 0 is contradicted by Lemma
2. Thus for all t = 0, ..., S, dµt ≥ 0 and dXt+1 ≥ 0 do not hold at the same time: either
dµt < 0 or dXt+1 < 0, where the relation “or” is not exclusive.
For t = 0, x0 > 0 by (A.6) so that (A.10) holds. It follows that dµ0 < 0 is equivalent
to dx0 > 0 since X
0 is given, which is equivalent by (32) to dX1 < 0. Thus the proposition
that “either dµ0 < 0 or dX1 < 0 holds” is equivalent to “dµ0 < 0 and dX1 < 0 hold.” 
The result that dµ0 < 0 and dX1 < 0 will be later exploited by use of the following
lemma, whose proof partly relies on the other part of Lemma 4.
Lemma 5 If, as a result of the reserve increase, dµt < 0 and dXt+1 < 0 for some t =
0, ..., S − 1, then dµt+1 < 0 and dXt+2 < 0.
 For some t = 0, ..., S − 1, assume that dµt < 0 and dXt+1 < 0 hold simultaneously.
Suppose, as an assumption to be contradicted, that dXt+2 ≥ 0.
There are several possibilities as far as extraction xt+1 is affected by the change in
reserves. First consider the case where xt+1 = 0 before and after the change. Then by (32),
dXt+2 = dXt+1 < 0, which contradicts the maintained assumption.
strictly concave by assumption and for any given reserves level X0−XF , the set of extraction possibilities is
convex since the convex combination of two possible extraction paths satisfying the exhaustibility constraint
satisfies the exhaustibility constraint. The Maximum Theorem thus applies, implying that the optimum
extraction path (xt, Xt)t≥0 is a continuous function of the reserve level X
0 − XF . In turn, because all
multipliers µt, t ≥ 0, are defined as continuous functions of xt and Xt by (A.10) and (A.14), it follows that
in optimum they are continuous functions of X0 −XF .
6
Consider now the case where extraction xt+1 was strictly positive before the change in
reserves and remains so after the change. By Lemma 4, dXt+2 ≥ 0 implies
dµt+1 < 0. (A.25)
On the other hand, by (32), dXt+2 ≥ 0 implies
dXt+1 ≥ dxt+1. (A.26)
Differentiating (A.10) at t+ 1 gives
dµt+1 = −
∂2Ct+1
∂x2
dxt+1 −
∂2Ct+1
∂x∂X
dXt+1,
where the coefficient of dxt+1 is strictly negative by assumption (A.3). Substituting for
dxt+1 by use of inequality (A.26) implies
dµt+1 ≥ −
[
∂2Ct+1
∂x2
+
∂2Ct+1
∂x∂X
]
dXt+1,
where the term between brackets is strictly positive by (30). Since dXt+1 < 0 by assumption
of the lemma, the inequality implies that dµt+1 > 0, which contradicts (A.25).
Therefore, whether extraction at t+1 remains zero or remains strictly positive as a result
of the reserve change, it must be true that dXt+2 < 0. Finally consider the (intermediate)
cases where xt+1 was zero and becomes strictly positive or, vice versa, was strictly positive
and becomes zero. By the Maximum Theorem (see Footnote 37 on how it applies here),
for any t ≥ 0, Xt+2 is continuous in reserves. Hence, the result that dXt+2 < 0 also applies
across the cases where extraction remains zero or strictly positive, that is in the intermediate
cases.
We conclude that, whether extraction was and remains zero or becomes strictly positive,
or else was strictly positive and remains so or falls to zero at date t + 1,
dXt+2 < 0.
It follows by (32) that
dXt+1 < dxt+1. (A.27)
Let us now show that dµt+1 < 0. Consider first that extraction xt+1 was null before
the reserve change and remains so after the change. In that case, µt+1 = µt before and
after the change by (A.13) or (A.14). It follows that dµt+1 = dµt < 0 by the lemma’s
assumption that dµt < 0. Consider now that extraction xt+1 was and remains strictly
positive. In that case, (A.10) holds at t+1 before and after the reserve change, which gives
dµt+1 = −
∂2Ct+1
∂x2
dxt+1 −
∂2Ct+1
∂x∂X
dXt+1, where the coefficient of dxt+1 is strictly negative by
(A.3). Substituting for dxt+1 by use of inequality (A.27) implies
dµt+1 ≤ −
[
∂2Ct+1
∂x2
+
∂2Ct+1
∂x∂X
]
dXt+1,
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where the term between brackets is strictly positive by (30). Since dXt+1 < 0 by assumption
of the lemma, the inequality implies that dµt+1 < 0. The continuity argument invoked
earlier (Maximum Theorem; see Footnote 37) also applies here for cases where extraction
xt+1 becomes positive or null as a result of the change in reserves. 
The following lemma concludes the proof of Proposition 4.1.
Lemma 6 As a result of the increase in reserves, dµt < 0 and dXt+1 < 0 for all t = 0, ..., S.
 By Lemma 4, dµ0 < 0. Since x0 > 0 by assumption (A.6), (A.10) holds, where X0 is
fixed. It follows from dµ0 < 0 in (A.10) that dx0 > 0. In turn, (32) implies dX1 < 0.
dµt < 0 and dXt+1 < 0 are thus simultaneously verified for t = 0, which implies by
Lemma 5 that dµt+1 < 0 and dXt+2 < 0, for all t = 0, ..., S − 1. Lemma 6 is obtained by
recurrence, thus completing the proof of Proposition 4.1. 
2. Cross-price effects on restricted and unrestricted supply
The following proof will simultaneously establish the effects of a price change on re-
stricted cumulative supply X0 − X˜t
(
p,X0 −XF
)
and on unrestricted cumulative supply
X0 − X∗t (p). X
∗
t (p) is the value of Xt in the solution of Problem (31)-(35), whose La-
grangian is (A.2), when xt, Xt and X
F are treated as endogenous; X˜t
(
p,X0 −XF
)
is the
value of Xt in the solution of Problem (31)-(35) when xt and Xt are endogenous but X
F is
exogenous.
We will consider a strict price rise dpT > 0 at some date T ≥ 1 that differs from the pre-
change date of last strictly-positive extraction, and is such that xT is strictly positive before
the change; the proof can easily be extended to T = 0 and to a price rise occurring at the
pre-change date of last extraction. The restriction that xT > 0 rules out the uninteresting
possibility that the price rise has no effect on λ because it applies to a null extraction base.
It also implies that the price rise does not occur at a date posterior to the pre-change date
of last extraction.
When the size of reserves is restricted, according to (A.21), the value of the marginal
unit of reserves is λ =
∂V(p,X0−XF )
∂(X0−XF )
, with
∂2V(p,X0−XF )
∂(X0−XF )∂pT
> 0. Thus the price rise dpT > 0 at
some date of the extraction phase implies dλ > 0.
When reserves are not restricted, there are two possibilities. When XF > 0, (A.19) and
(A.21) hold: Developed and exploited reserves X0 − XF and their marginal value λ are
jointly determined by the equality of the strictly rising marginal development cost function
E ′(X0 −XF ) with the decreasing marginal value of reserves
∂V(p,X0−XF )
∂(X0−XF )
. In that context,
a price rise dpT > 0 at some date of the extraction phase causes a rise dλ > 0 and an
increase in developed and exploited reserves d(X0 − XF ) > 0 or, equivalently, dXF < 0.
When XF = 0 before the price rise, the above effect does not take place: d(X0 −XF ) = 0
despite the absence of reserve restriction so that dλ > 0 as when reserves are restricted.
The following lemma gathers those results.
Lemma 7 A price rise dpT > 0 at some date T ≥ 1 such that xT > 0 and T strictly
precedes the last date of strictly positive extraction, causes the value of the marginal reserve
unit to increase strictly (dλ > 0) and developed reserves to increase (dXF ≤ 0).
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The possibility that dXF = 0 ensures that Lemma 7 holds whether supply is restricted
or unrestricted and, in the latter case, whether the constraint XF ≥ 0 is binding or not.
The second step of this proof involves the backward recurrence described in Lemma 8.
This recurrence will be used to assess the effect of the price change on quantities at the
terminal date S and then at all dates between T and S.
Lemma 8 If, as a result of the date-T price rise, dµt > 0 and dXt ≤ dxt ≤ 0 for some
date t ≤ S, t 6= T , then dµt−1 > 0 and dXt−1 ≤ dxt−1 ≤ 0, t− 1 6= T .
 Assume that for some date t 6= T , 1 < t ≤ S, dµt > 0 and dXt ≤ dxt ≤ 0.
First, consider the case where xt was null before the price change and remains so after-
wards. Then, dxt = 0, so that µt−1 = µt by (A.13). By the maintained assumption dµt > 0,
it follows that dµt−1 = dµt > 0 in that case.
Second, consider the situation where xt was strictly positive before the change in price,
and remains so with the change. (A.10) holds in that case; totally differentiating (A.10) at
date t and using dµt > 0 yields
dxt <
− ∂
2Ct
∂x∂X
∂2Ct
∂x2
dXt. (A.28)
Assume now that t− 1 6= T . Replacing µt in (A.15) by its expression as per (A.10) and
totally differentiating give
dµt−1 = −
[
∂2Ct
∂x2
+
∂2Ct
∂x∂X
]
dxt −
[
∂2Ct
∂X2
+
∂2Ct
∂X∂x
]
dXt,
where the first term between brackets is strictly positive by assumption (30). Substituting
dxt by use of inequality (A.28) and rearranging, we obtain
dµt−1 >
(
∂2Ct
∂x2
)−1 [(
∂2Ct
∂x∂X
)2
−
∂2Ct
∂x2
∂2Ct
∂X2
]
dXt, (A.29)
where by assumption (A.3) the term between parentheses is positive and the term between
brackets is negative. Since dXt ≤ 0 by the assumption of this proof, it follows from (A.29)
that dµt−1 > 0 also in that case.
One can conclude that the rise in price yields dµt−1 > 0, whether xt decreases and
remains strictly positive or xt is and remains zero. The Maximum Theorem implies that
µt−1 is continuous
38 across these cases, so that dµt−1 > 0 also holds as a result of the price
rise when xt decreases from a strictly positive level to zero.
38The Maximum Theorem applies to price changes in the context of this proof as explained shortly
below. The continuity of multipliers µt, for all dates t ≥ 0 follows because those multipliers are continuous
functions of xt and Xt variables and price parameters by (A.10), (A.13) and (A.14). Whether Problem
(31)-(35) is restricted (X0 −XF given) or not (XF free), the Maximum Theorem applies as follows, when
the parameters of interest are prices. The extraction possibility set defined by (32), (33) and (35), is
independent of price parameters, hence continuous. Price parameters also continuously affect the objective
(31). Even in the unrestricted problem, the finiteness of geological reserves X0 ensures that developed
reserves X0 − XF ≥ 0 are finite. Thus the extraction possibility set is bounded, and is evidently closed.
Furthermore, the objective (31) is strictly concave by assumption and for any vector of prices, the set of
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As far as date t−1 is concerned, there are two possibilities. If xt−1 was and remains zero
following the price rise, dxt−1 = 0 so that (32) implies dXt−1 = dXt ≤ 0 by the maintained
assumptions. Therefore, dXt−1 ≤ 0 = dxt−1; the lemma applies in that case.
When xt−1 > 0, the maintained assumption dXt ≤ 0 implies by (32) that
dXt−1 ≤ dxt−1. (A.30)
On the other hand, the differentiation of (A.10) at t − 1 gives dµt−1 = −
∂2Ct−1
∂x2
dxt−1 −
∂2Ct−1
∂x∂X
dXt−1, where
∂2Ct−1
∂x∂X
is strictly negative by assumption (29). Substituting for dXt−1
by use of inequality (A.30) thus yields
dµt−1 < −
[
∂2Ct−1
∂x2
+
∂2Ct−1
∂x∂X
]
dxt−1,
where the term between brackets is positive by assumption (30). We have shown above that
dµt−1 > 0, so that dxt−1 must be strictly negative. (A.30) thus implies dXt−1 ≤ dxt−1 < 0.
In the case where xt−1 decreases with the price rise in such a way that it becomes zero,
the latter inequality must be adjusted to dXt−1 ≤ dxt−1 ≤ 0; the lemma also applies. 
Let us now examine the effect of the price change at the last extraction date S.
Lemma 9 Following the date-T price rise, at the date S of last strictly positive extraction,
dµS > 0 and dXS ≤ dxS < 0.
 The date of last extraction may change as a result of the price rise considered in Lemma
7. However it cannot be postponed. Date T of the price rise does not occur at a date with
no extraction; thus T is not posterior to the pre-change last extraction date. Therefore if S
is a date at which extraction had already stopped before the price rise, condition (A.12) had
to hold before the price rise; considering (A.17), this implies that µt = λ > pt −
∂Ct(0,XF )
∂x
,
where by Lemma 7 the price change induces dλ > 0 and dXF ≤ 0. It follows from (29)
that dXF ≤ 0 does not reduce the marginal cost ∂Ct(0,X
F )
∂x
; as a result, no rise dxt > 0 can
cause equality (A.10) to be satisfied. However, following the price rise, (A.10) must hold at
S by definition of the after-change last strictly-positive extraction date.
Thus S can only be advanced or left unchanged by the price rise. Then the equalities
µS = λ and XS+1 = X
F hold as per (A.17) and (A.8) respectively. Thus Lemma 7
implies dµS > 0 and dXS+1 ≤ 0; the latter is equivalent by (32) to dXS ≤ dxS. Totally
differentiating (A.10) and substituting dXS by use of the latter inequality yield
dµS ≤ −
[
∂2CS
∂x2
+
∂2CS
∂x∂X
]
dxS, (A.31)
where the term between brackets is positive by assumption (30). Since dµS > 0 in this case,
extraction possibilities is convex since the convex combination of two possible extraction paths satisfying
the exhaustibility constraint satisfies the exhaustibility constraint. The Maximum Theorem thus applies,
implying that the optimum extraction path (xt, Xt)t≥0 is a continuous function of any component of the
price vector.
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it follows from inequality (A.31) that dxS < 0, which remains compatible with xS > 0.
Therefore, dXS ≤ dxS < 0. 
Lemma 10 immediately follows from the combination of Lemma 9 with Lemma 8’s
recurrence.
Lemma 10 As a result of the date-T price rise, dµt > 0 and dXt ≤ dxt ≤ 0, for all
t = T + 1, ..., S.
Let us now examine the effects of the price rise at the date T when it occurs. We will
establish the following lemma.
Lemma 11 As a result of the date-T price rise, dxT > 0, dXT ≤ dxT , and dµT > 0.
 By Lemma 10,
dXT+1 ≤ dxT+1 ≤ 0, (A.32)
where dXT+1 ≤ 0 implies
dXT ≤ dxT .
The law of supply prevails at date T , which implies, under Lemma 7’s assumption that
xT > 0, the strict inequality
dxT > 0. (A.33)
From Lemma 10, dµT+1 > 0. Let us now show that dµT > 0.
Consider first the case xT+1 = 0 before and after the price change; by (A.13), µT = µT+1.
It follows that dµT = dµT+1 > 0.
Now consider the case where xT+1 was strictly positive before the price change and
remains so. Then, (A.10) holds; dµT+1 > 0 implies
dxT+1 <
−∂
2CT+1
∂x∂X
∂2CT+1
∂x2
dXT+1. (A.34)
Taking (A.15) at t = T + 1 and using (A.10) to eliminate µT+1 gives
dµT = −
[
∂2CT+1
∂x2
+
∂2CT+1
∂x∂X
]
dxT+1 −
[
∂2CT+1
∂X2
+
∂2CT+1
∂X∂x
]
dXT+1,
where the first term between brackets is strictly positive by assumption (30). Substituting
dxT+1 by use of inequality (A.34) and rearranging, one obtains
dµT >
(
∂2CT+1
∂x2
)−1 [(
∂2CT+1
∂x∂X
)2
−
∂2CT+1
∂x2
∂2CT+1
∂X2
]
dXT+1,
where by assumption (A.3) the term between parentheses is strictly positive and the term
between brackets is strictly negative. Since dXT+1 ≤ 0, the latter inequality implies that
dµT > 0.
Finally consider the situation where xT+1 was strictly positive before the change and
decreases so as to become null with the price change. By the Maximum Theorem (see
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Footnote 38), the continuity of xT+1 with the price guarantees that the above results apply
in that situation. 
The analysis will now turn to the effect of the price change on quantities at dates that
precede the date T of the change. We will first establish the following recurrence, that will
be used shortly below.
Lemma 12 If, as a result of the price rise, dµt ≤ 0 and dXt+1 ≤ 0 for some t = 0, ..., T−2,
then dµt+1 ≤ 0 and dXt+2 ≤ 0.
 For some t = 0, ..., T −2, assume that dµt ≤ 0 and dXt+1 ≤ 0 as a result of the price rise.
Consider first the case where xt+1 was zero before the price rise and remains so after-
wards. In that case, by (A.13), µt = µt+1. It follows that dµt+1 = dµt ≤ 0. Moreover,
differentiating (32) gives dXt+2 = dXt+1−dxt+1. With dxt+1 = 0 in that case and dXt+1 ≤ 0
by the maintained assumption, it follows dXt+2 ≤ 0.
Second, consider the case where extraction xt+1 initially was and remains strictly positive
with the price rise so that (A.10) holds. Taking (A.15) at t+1, substituting for dµt+1 using
(A.10), and differentiating, we obtain
dµt = −
[
∂2Ct+1
∂x2
+
∂2Ct+1
∂x∂X
]
dxt+1 −
[
∂2Ct+1
∂X2
+
∂2Ct+1
∂X∂x
]
dXt+1,
where the first term between brackets is strictly positive by assumption (30). Thus dµt ≤ 0
implies
dxt+1 ≥
−
[
∂2Ct+1
∂X2
+ ∂
2Ct+1
∂X∂x
]
[
∂2Ct+1
∂x2
+ ∂
2Ct+1
∂x∂X
] dXt+1. (A.35)
On the other hand, the differentiation of (A.10) at t + 1 yields
dµt+1 = −
∂2Ct+1
∂x2
dxt+1 −
∂2Ct+1
∂x∂X
dXt+1, (A.36)
where −∂
2Ct+1
∂x2
is strictly negative by (A.3). Substituting for dxt+1 using (A.35) and rear-
ranging, one obtains
dµt+1 ≤
[
∂2Ct+1
∂x2
∂2Ct+1
∂X2
−
(
∂2Ct+1
∂x∂X
)2]
[
∂2Ct+1
∂x2
+ ∂
2Ct+1
∂x∂X
] dXt+1,
where the coefficient of dXt+1 is strictly positive by (30) and (A.3). Thus the assumption
dXt+1 ≤ 0 implies dµt+1 ≤ 0.
With dµt+1 ≤ 0, (A.36) implies
dxt+1 ≥
−∂
2Ct+1
∂x∂X
∂2Ct+1
∂x2
dXt+1,
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where the coefficient of dXt+1 is positive and lower than unity by (30), while dXt+1 ≤ 0 by
the maintained assumption. It follows that dxt+1 ≥ dXt+1, which by (32) implies dXt+2 ≤ 0.
Last, by continuity (see Footnote 38 on the Maximum Theorem), the above results also
hold across cases, when xt+1 becomes strictly positive or becomes zero following the price
rise. 
We can now show the following result.
Lemma 13 As a result of the price rise, dµ0 > 0 and, for all t = 1, ..., T , either dµt > 0
or dXt+1 > 0.
 As a result of Lemma 12’s recurrence, if dµt ≤ 0 and dXt+1 ≤ 0 for some t ≤ T − 2, then
dµT−1 ≤ 0 and dXT ≤ 0. Suppose, as an assumption to be contradicted, that dµT−1 ≤ 0
and dXT ≤ 0. Differentiating (A.15) at t = T , we have
dµT−1 = dµT −
∂2CT
∂X∂x
dxT −
∂2CT
∂X2
dXT .
On the left-hand side, dµT−1 ≤ 0 by assumption. On the right-hand side, the last term
is positive by (A.3) and by the maintained assumption dXT ≤ 0; dµT > 0 by Lemma 11;
and the second term is strictly positive by Lemma 11 and (29). Thus the right-hand side
is strictly positive while the left-hand side in non positive. This contradiction implies that
dµT−1 ≤ 0 and dXT ≤ 0 do not hold simultaneously so that either dµT−1 > 0 or (non
exclusive) dXT > 0.
Now use the following contrapositive of Lemma 12’s implication: If as a result of the
price rise, for some t = 0, ..., T − 2, dµt+1 > 0 or (non exclusive) dXt+2 > 0, then either
dµt > 0 or (non exclusive) dXt+1 > 0. By backward recurrence, starting from the result
established above that either dµT−1 > 0 or (non exclusive) dXT > 0, it follows that, for all
t = 0, ..., T −1, either dµt > 0 or (non exclusive) dXt+1 > 0. At date t = 0, we have already
shown by differentiation of (A.10) where X0 is given, that dµ0 > 0 is equivalent to dx0 < 0,
also equivalent by (32) to dX1 > 0. Therefore, “dµ0 > 0 or (non exclusive) dX1 > 0” is
equivalent to “dµ0 > 0 (and dX1 > 0).” 
The following lemma will conclude the proof of Proposition 4.2.
Lemma 14 As a result of the date-T price rise, dµt > 0 and dXt+1 > 0, for all t =
0, ..., T − 1.
 By Lemma 13, dµ0 > 0, and therefore, dX1 > 0. Assume that for some t = 0, ..., T − 2,
dµt > 0 and dXt+1 > 0; we will show that this implies dµt+1 > 0 and dXt+2 > 0.
First consider the situation where xt+1 = 0 before and after the change in price. In
that case, by (A.13), µt = µt+1, which immediately shows that dµt+1 > 0. Also, the
differentiation of (32) with dxt+1 = 0 implies dXt+2 = dXt+1 > 0.
Second, consider that xt+1 was strictly positive and remains so after the change. In that
case, (A.10) holds at t+ 1. Suppose, as an assumption to be contradicted, that dµt+1 ≤ 0.
On the one hand, by the total differentiation of (A.10) at date t+1, dµt+1 ≤ 0 is equivalent
to
dxt+1 ≥
−∂
2Ct+1
∂x∂X
∂2Ct+1
∂x2
dXt+1. (A.37)
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On the other hand, totally differentiating (A.15) at t + 1 and substituting for dµt+1 from
(A.10) yield
dµt = −
[
∂2Ct+1
∂x2
+
∂2Ct+1
∂x∂X
]
dxt+1 −
[
∂2Ct+1
∂X∂x
+
∂2Ct+1
∂X2
]
dXt+1, (A.38)
where the first term between brackets on the right-hand side is strictly positive by assump-
tion (30). Using (A.37) and simplifying it follows that
dµt ≤
(
∂2Ct+1
∂x2
)−1 [(
∂2Ct+1
∂x∂X
)2
−
∂2Ct+1
∂x2
∂2Ct+1
∂X2
]
dXt+1, (A.39)
where assumption (A.3) implies that the coefficient of dXt+1 is strictly negative. Thus
the lemma’s assumption that dXt+1 > 0 implies dµt < 0, which contradicts the other
lemma’s assumption that dµt > 0. Thus the maintained assumption dµt+1 ≤ 0 implies a
contradiction and one must conclude that dµt+1 > 0.
We still have to show that dXt+2 > 0. By (A.10), the rise dµt+1 > 0 requires a strict
reduction in ∂Ct+1
∂x
, that is
dxt+1 <
−∂
2Ct+1
∂x∂X
∂2Ct+1
∂x2
dXt+1. (A.40)
By assumptions (30) and (A.3), the coefficient of dXt+1 in the above inequality is strictly
positive and lower than unity. Since dXt+1 > 0 as maintained assumption, it follows from
(A.40) that dxt+1 < dXt+1. The latter inequality finally implies by (32) that dXt+2 > 0.
Given that the maintained assumption dµt > 0 and dXt+1 > 0 is satisfied at t = 0
(Lemma 13), Lemma 14 has been proven both when extraction xt+1 is and remains null or
when it is and remains strictly positive. By continuity (see the application of the Maximum
Theorem in Footnote 38), it follows that Lemma 14 also holds across cases, that is when
xt+1 becomes null or becomes strictly positive following the price rise. 
Let us now sum up the results. As a consequence of the rise in pT , Xt increases by
Lemma 14, implying that cumulative supply X0 − Xt decreases, at all dates t = 1, ..., T .
By the law of supply (Lemma 11), date-T instantaneous supply xT not only increases but
increases in such a way that the subsequent cumulative supply X0 − XT+1 is higher than
before the price rise. However instantaneous supply xt decreases at all subsequent dates
t > T by Lemma 10. Hence, defining cumulative supply as excluding date-T supply yields
the second point of Proposition 4.
B Multiple Deposits with Endogenous Production Periods
As mentioned in Subsection 4.b, when development dates τ j , j = 1, ..., J , are fixed, the
problem for each individual deposit j is identical to the single-deposit problem of Section 2.
By Proposition 1, for each independent deposit j = 1, ..., J , and thus at the aggregate level,
an exogenous rise in exploitable reserves increases restricted supply at all dates t ≥ τ j , and
a price rise at some date T > 0 reduces restricted (short run) and unrestricted (medium
run) supply of active deposits at all dates τ j ≤ t < T .
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Therefore in the sequel, we analyze the long run, when both exploitable reserves Xj
and development dates τ j are choice variables, j = 1, ..., J . Since the exploitation of each
deposit is independent of other deposits, let us focus on deposit j. Consider at this stage
the development date τ j as given. Conditional on τ j , optimum extraction flows xjt (p, τ
j)
for all t ≥ τ j are determined by (44) where λj = λj(p, τ j) will be characterized shortly.
On the one hand, λj(p, τ j) reflects the contribution of marginal reserves at the producer’s
optimum. Indeed, denoting deposit-j’s value function conditional on τ j by
Vj
(
p, τ j , Xj
)
≡ max
(xjt )t≥τj
∑
t≥τ j
ptx
j
t − C
j
t (x
j
t ) (B.1)
subject to
∑
t≥τ j
xjt ≤ X
j , (B.2)
and keeping in mind that λj(p, τ j) is formally the Lagrange multiplier associated with
constraint (B.2), the Envelope Theorem for constrained problems implies
λj(p, τ j) =
∂Vj (p, τ j , Xj(p, τ j))
∂Xj
, (B.3)
which relates the optimum amount of reserves Xj(p, τ j) with their implicit value λj(p, τ j).
In equation (B.3),
∂Vj(p,τ j,Xj)
∂Xj
is a decreasing function of reserves Xj by the assumption
that extraction costs are strictly convex. Moreover, it is a decreasing function of τ j , since
exploiting unchanged reserves Xj over a smaller set of dates means that marginal reserves
must optimally be extracted at higher costs.
On the other hand, (45) indicates that exploitable reserves Xj(p, τ j) are optimally pro-
duced in such a way as to equate their marginal development cost Ej ′
τ j
(Xj(p, τ j)) with their
implicit valuation underground λj(p, τ j). This reserve-supply relation is strictly increasing
since the Ej
τ j
function is strictly convex by assumption.
Thus in optimum, for a given development date τ j , the rent λj(p, τ j) and reserves
Xj(p, τ j) are jointly determined by the combination of (B.3) with (45):
∂Vj (p, τ j, Xj(p, τ j))
∂Xj
= λj(p, τ j) = Ej ′
τ j
(
Xj(p, τ j)
)
. (B.4)
2.a Proof of Lemma 1
The optimum rent λj(p, τ j) and optimum reserves depend on the (at this stage) exogenous
development date τ j . As explained above,
∂Vj(p,τ j,Xj)
∂Xj
is decreasing in τ j . Let τ j′ < τ j be
two exogenous development dates: It must be that
∂Vj(p,τ j′,Xj)
∂Xj
≥
∂Vj(p,τ j ,Xj)
∂Xj
. Moreover,
by assumption (41), Ej ′
τ j′
(Xj) ≥ Ej ′
τ j
(Xj). It thus follows that (B.4) taken at τ j and at
τ j′ < τ j generates two different rents such that
λj(p, τ j′) ≥ λj(p, τ j), τ j′ < τ j . (B.5)
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For any given development date τ j , the Maximum Theorem applies.39 Thus price changes
continuously affect all variables and functions. In particular, if τ j is the optimum devel-
opment date, small changes in price that do not require any change in that date have
continuous effects.
Consider now that τ j = argmax
τ≥0
Vj (p,Xj(p, τ), τ) − Ejτ (X
j(p, τ)), where, given τ ,
Xj(p, τ) is chosen optimally as described above. It follows that, for any τ j′ 6= τ j ,
Vj
(
p,Xj(p, τ j), τ j
)
− Ej
τ j
(
Xj(p, τ j)
)
−
[
Vj
(
p,Xj(p, τ j′), τ j′
)
− Ej
τ j′
(
Xj(p, τ j′)
)]
≥ 0.
(B.6)
The first part of the lemma considers a price rise at some date T , posterior to the deposit-
opening date τ j . Assuming instead that T ≤ τ j′ < τ j , let us show now that no increase
in price can cause (B.6) to be violated, so that a price rise cannot cause the development
date to be accelerated. Precisely, consider an infinitesimal change in price at date T > τ j .
Denoting by ∆ the total derivative of the left-hand side of inequality (B.6), one obtains
∆ =
∂Vj (p,Xj(p, τ j), τ j)
∂pT
+
∂Vj (p,Xj(p, τ j), τ j)
∂Xj
dXj(p, τ j)
dpT
− Ej ′
τ j
(
Xj(p, τ j)
) dXj(p, τ j)
dpT
−
[
∂Vj (p,Xj(p, τ j′), τ j′)
∂pT
+
∂Vj (p,Xj(p, τ j′), τ j′)
∂Xj
dXj(p, τ j′)
dpT
− Ej ′
τ j′
(
Xj(p, τ j′)
) dXj(p, τ j′)
dpT
]
.
Recalling the second equality in (B.4), we have
∂Vj (p,Xj(p, τ j), τ j)
∂Xj
dXj(p, τ j)
dpT
− Ej ′
τ j
(
Xj(p, τ j)
) dXj(p, τ j)
dpT
= 0
and similarly for τ j′. Thus, ∆ may be rewritten
∆ =
∂Vj (p,Xj(p, τ j), τ j)
∂pT
−
[
∂Vj (p,Xj(p, τ j′), τ j′)
∂pT
]
,
where the Envelope Theorem applied to (B.1)-(B.2) implies
∂Vj (p,Xj(p, τ j), τ j)
∂pT
= xjT (p, τ
j),
for τ j and for τ j′. ∆ thus reduces to
∆ = xjT (p, τ
j)− xjT (p, τ
j′).
39 When reserves are endogenously determined at the exogenous date τ j , the optimal reserves Xj(p, τ j)
must be finite so that the extraction possibility set is bounded, and is evidently closed. Prices in p also
affect the objective (42) continuously. Furthermore, this objective is strictly concave by assumption and
the set of extraction possibilities is convex since the convex combination of two possible extraction paths
satisfying the exhaustibility constraint (40) satisfies the same constraint. The Maximum Theorem thus
applies: Given the development date τ j , the optimum sequence of extraction xjt (p, τ
j) and the multiplier
λj(p, τ j) evaluated at the optimum are continuous functions of each price in the vector p.
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Finally, the inequality (B.5) established above, together with the first-order condition
(44) characterizing extraction at date T implies that xjT (p, τ
j) ≥ xjT (p, τ
j′), which proves
that
∆ ≥ 0.
Since a price rise positively affects the left-hand side of inequality (B.6), it cannot cause
the earlier date τ j′ < τ j to become the optimal development date.
The second part of the lemma considers a price rise occurring at date T prior to the
deposit-opening date τ j . Under the initial prices, assume that extraction takes place at
dates t ≥ τ j ≥ T and reserves are optimally developed at τ j ; that must yield higher
intertemporal profits (42) than opening the deposit at a later date. A postponing of the
opening date τ j to τ j′ > τ j would restrict extraction to dates t ≥ τ j′ > τ j , over which
price conditions are unchanged by the rise in price at T . Clearly, that restriction cannot
dominate the possibility of extracting at the larger set of dates t ≥ τ j .
2.b Proof of Proposition 5
The first two points of the proposition are shown in the main text, as well as the first part
of the third point; there remains the second part of the third point. We need to show that,
if the development-cost function Ej
τ j
is time autonomous, then a price rise at T > 0 reduces
long-run aggregate supply at all dates t 6= T as in the second point of the proposition.
Assume that the deposit-development date τ j is endogenous. When the function Ej
τ j
does not depend on τ j , the Maximum Theorem applies as in Footnote 39 even though τ j
is endogenous; the objective (42) is continuous in price parameters because a price change,
even if it causes a change in τj , does not affect the development technology encompassed
in the Ej function.
By the Maximum Theorem, a rise in price continuously affects extraction xjt (p); it follows
that the results established for a fixed opening date carry over when the opening date may
change as a result of a price rise.
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